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 Extramarital Relationships and the 
Theoretical Rationales for the Joint Property 
Rules – A New Model 
Yitshak Cohen* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article considers the weight of extramarital relationships in deter-
mining the distribution of family property.  Under the U.S. legal system, opin-
ions differ as to whether this fault should be a factor in distribution of family 
property.  The controversy is influenced by and arises from an earlier disa-
greement that followed the “no-fault” revolution of the 1970s, which focused 
on the role of fault in divorce proceedings.  The discussion of fault with re-
gard to property distribution took place without in-depth consideration of the 
underlying basis and rationales for the principles of joint property and, even 
more importantly, without relating to their modern, theoretical and current 
bases.  This Article fills this void, clarifies the modern bases for the principles 
of joint property, and, through them, sheds new light on the role of fault.  This 
analysis produces a new model for examining the relevance of fault in prop-
erty distribution. 
In order to clearly and precisely focus on the theoretical rationales for 
joint family property and the establishment of a new model, this Article also 
examines the Israeli legal system.  At the end of the 1970s, one court decision 
determined, without explanation, that extramarital relationships are not a 
relevant consideration in property distribution.  Subsequent rulings cited this 
decision without further discussion.  This Article seeks to bridge the gap in 
the Israeli legal system as well.  For that purpose, the Article analyzes the 
theoretical bases of property distribution principles under both Israeli law 
and Jewish religious law, including the ways in which these legal systems 
each relate to extramarital relationships.  This Article questions whether the 
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strong position of the Israeli court is consistent with the modern theoretical 
bases for joint property.  These doubts are strengthened by the fact that there 
is no other practical way to compensate one spouse who has been harmed by 
the extramarital relationship of the other spouse. 
Developments and new approaches in family law that are relevant to 
our discussion include matters such as: divorce without fault but by demand 
– a relationship terminable at-will; removal of fault as a relevant factor in 
divorce proceedings; modern theoretical bases for joint property such as the 
values of labor, reward for work, morality and equality; societal perceptions 
of the family unit; the realization that the no-fault divorce revolution was 
detrimental to the family unit; disappointment in tort law as a means for re-
sponding to harm resulting from extramarital relationships, and more.  In 
light of these developments, a need has emerged to renew the balance among 
the relevant values and to offer a new model for weighing fault in family 
property distribution. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Extramarital relationships are not a new occurrence in married life.  At 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, they were the most common cause of 
divorce between spouses,1 and today they continue to be widespread.2  Hu-
man history has looked upon this phenomenon severely and imposed harsh 
punishments on the spouse who is the “wrongdoer”: “Human civilization has 
long maintained legal consequences for the marital love triangle.  We know, 
for example, that primitive societies punished adultery with severe penalties.  
It is also well known that Hebraic law specifically proscribes adultery, in the 
Seventh of its Ten Commandments. . . . Classical culture also forbade extra-
marital affairs.”3  In recent history, the legal system has undergone significant 
change.4  In this Article, I review how the law addresses extramarital relation-
ships with respect to the distribution of family property.  I examine the theo-
retical and modern bases for joint property and suggest a new and appropriate 
model for its distribution.  Accordingly, this Article investigates and exam-
ines the dramatic transitions that took place within the legal systems of the 
United States during the last four decades, starting with the exclusion of fault 
from divorce and ending with the change in the consideration of fault in 
property distribution.  The Article also presents the positions of Israeli law 
and Jewish religious law on these matters.  The analysis will provide a broad 
perspective and assist in offering a new model for balancing the values that 
impact consideration of fault in property distribution. 
The discussion of extramarital relationships requires conceptual clarifi-
cation of the term “fault” in family law.  This term is primarily used in tort 
law, where its meaning is inappropriate or unreasonable behavior.  In family 
law, vagueness surrounds this term.  Nevertheless, “fault” can, in principle, 
be divided into three categories: “economic fault,” expressed by inappropriate 
economic behavior, such as lack of contribution to the family effort, waste of 
the family’s assets, etc.; “violent fault,” expressed in physical or psychologi-
cal violence of one spouse towards the other; and, finally, “sexual fault,” ex-
 
 1. Laura Bradford, Note, The Counterrevolution: A Critique of Recent Pro-
posals to Reform No-Fault Divorce Laws, 49 STAN. L. REV. 607, 610 (1997). 
 2. Studies in the United States show that 40-50% of women have extramarital 
“affairs.”  See Robert R. Bell et al., A Multivariate Analysis of Female Extramarital 
Coitus, 37 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 375, 380 (1975).  Another study reveals that about 
70% of men under age forty state that they do not negate the possibility that they will 
be involved in an extramarital affair.  LYNN ATWATER, THE EXTRAMARITAL 
CONNECTION: SEX, INTIMACY, AND IDENTITY 15 (1982).  An additional study shows 
that more than half of the people involved in the study had had an extramarital affair 
at least once.  CONSTANCE AHRONS, THE GOOD DIVORCE: KEEPING YOUR FAMILY 
TOGETHER WHEN YOUR MARRIAGE COMES APART 101 (1994). 
 3. Jeffrey Brian Greenstein, Sex, Lies and American Tort Law: The Love Trian-
gle in Context, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 723, 724 (2004). 
 4. Guido Tedeschi, The Family Crisis and Traditionalists, in LEGAL STUDIES IN 
MEMORY OF AVRAHAM ROSENTHAL 282 (Guido Tedeschi, ed., 1964). 
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pressed by inappropriate sexual behavior of one of the spouses, primarily a 
romantic extramarital relationship.  This Article devotes its discussion to this 
third category of fault – specifically, extramarital relationships.  A portion of 
the following discussion is also relevant to other behaviors within a marital 
relationship, but these behaviors might be treated differently than extramarital 
relationships.  5  
Clearly, the matter raises not only a technical-arithmetic question with 
respect to the determination of property distribution.  It is also influenced by 
worldviews, values, and societal perceptions of the family unit and the appro-
priate commitment to a relationship.  In addition, it is inherently impacted by 
developments that have taken place in the western world.  Thus, as long as 
society views marriage as an important public institution, society will allow 
itself to determine under which circumstances a marriage can be dissolved 
and the price that will be paid by the person at fault for its dissolution.  In 
contrast, if society views marriage as a private institution, fault for its dissolu-
tion will be regarded more leniently.  Either way, it is impossible to examine 
these issues without first understanding the principles of joint family property 
and their theoretical rationales. 
I.  PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION AND EXTRAMARITAL RELATIONSHIPS – 
THE LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 
A.  The System of Family Property Distribution 
Family law in the United States is included under state law and the in-
dependent legislation of each state.6  In the past, most states distributed the 
property acquired during a marriage (hereinafter “the family property”) ac-
cording to the traditional principles of common law.7  Those states treated 
family property as the separate property of each of the spouses, unless the 
spouses took steps to transform it into joint property.8  This system left most 
 
 5. The distinction between the different kinds of fault has much practical signif-
icance beyond the analytical differentiation.  From the normative foundation of the 
laws of property between spouses, it follows that the influence of fault should change 
according to the type of fault.  The various types of fault are different from one an-
other on several levels: the types differ in their intensity and severity, they vary in 
impact on the “innocent” spouse, and they vary in the way in which the laws relate to 
them, etc.  For a broader discussion, see Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, Moral Considera-
tions in Family Law and a Feminist Reading of Family Cases in Israel, in READINGS 
IN FEMINISM, GENDER AND LAW 651 (Barak-Erez et al. eds., 2007). 
 6. See, e.g., Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899) (“[T]he whole subject 
of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of 
[each] state, and not to the laws of the United States.”); see also Boddie v. Connecti-
cut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971). 
 7. Am. L. Inst., Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Rec-
ommendations, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 20, 19 (2001). 
 8. Id. 
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of the family property in the hands of the individual who actually purchased it 
and registered it.9  In contrast, the system of joint property was established in 
several states.  The joint property regime sets forth the opposite assumption: 
all profits accumulated by the spouses during the marriage are family proper-
ty (also referred to as community property).10  Each spouse is entitled to one-
half of such property.  In the states that applied this system, joint property is 
obligatory, so the value of the property, and not the actual ownership, is di-
vided in half. 11   These states use alimony as a means of balancing the proper-
ty division between the spouses when no property is available.12 
Later, the “common law” states shifted to a property regime that distrib-
utes family property according to a different doctrine called equitable distri-
bution.  Equitable distribution requires that the court weigh many parame-
ters13 and attempt to divide family property in a fair and just way that is not 
necessarily equal.14  It certainly would be possible that the portion allocated 
to a mother who was a housewife and gave up her personal career develop-
ment would be greater than half of the family property but it could also be 
less than that.   15   Five of the “joint property” states followed the common law 
regime’s lead and also adopted the system of equitable distribution rather 
than equal distribution.  The system of equitable distribution is the system 
prevailing today throughout the United States, except for three states that 
remain under the system of equal distribution.  16   Under some circumstances, 
 
 9. Support payments (originally called “spousal maintenance” or “spousal sup-
port” and later “alimony”) were a means of providing monetary assistance that was 
aimed at compensating the woman for the imbalance in property distribution.  See 
Roderic Duncan, Alimony: What You Need to Know Before Divorce, NOLO, 
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/alimony-what-you-need-know-30081.html 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2015). 
 10. See Am. L. Inst., supra note 7, at 20. 
 11. See id. at 20. 
 12. See Adriaen M. Morse Jr., Comment, Fault: A Viable Means of Re-Injecting 
Responsibility in Marital Relations, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 605, 642 (1996) (“In view of 
the lack of property available to most couples for division upon divorce, alimony 
should become the courts’ primary tool in fixing equitable results upon divorce.”). 
 13. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307 [Alt. A], 9A U.L.A. 
(1973) (including parameters such as “age, health, station, occupation, amount and 
sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of 
each of the parties, . . . and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital 
assets and income”); see also Am. L. Inst., supra note 7, at 19-24. 
 14. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-05-24 (West 2013) (“When a divorce 
is granted, the court shall make an equitable distribution of the property and debts of 
the parties.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Giammarco v. Giammarco, 959 A.2d 531, 532-34 (R.I. 2008) (af-
firming the lower court’s grant to wife of only 35% of the family property, reasoning 
that she assisted less in acquiring it). 
 16. Am. L. Inst., supra note 7, at 20. 
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the system of equitable distribution makes the payment of alimony after a 
marriage unnecessary.17 
However, the consensus among equitable distribution states is not very 
broad.  In states that previously employed joint property, joint property prin-
ciples still apply during the marriage.  In other words, throughout the mar-
riage, the spouse in whose name the property is registered is not entitled to 
sell the property because joint rights exist throughout the marriage.  In con-
trast, states that were “common law” states maintain the traditional concept of 
separation of property during the marriage, up until the time of divorce.18  
These different perspectives bring about different results when determining 
equitable distribution. 
Thus, for example, the system of equitable distribution struggles with 
how to categorize property registered in the name of one spouse prior to the 
marriage.  States in which the joint property system was formerly in place 
tend to include such property in the joint property, while the “common law” 
states tend to view it as separate property.19  The customary default in the 
equitable distribution system is equal distribution.  This default is more estab-
lished in states where inherited property or property purchased prior to the 
marriage is excluded from family property.20  For example, California deter-
mines equal distribution in every situation but, at the same time, specifically 
excludes separate personal property from family property.21  In contrast, New 
York considered revolutionizing its system by transitioning from the separate 
property regime to the equal distribution regime.22  In the end, New York 
reached a compromise and adopted an intermediate solution – the system of 
equitable distribution.23  Ten years later, these concepts are virtually indistin-
guishable.24 
In most states, the default in the system of equitable distribution is equal 
distribution.  Thus, the primary question is identifying when it is appropriate 
for a court to distribute property in an unequal manner.  With respect to our 
discussion, this is a question of which behaviors a court is allowed to consid-
 
 17. Brooke Grossman, Note, The Evolution of Equitable Distribution in New 
York, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 607, 625 (2007) (“Equitable division of assets 
acquired during the marriage replaced alimony, the traditional method of support.  
The purpose of equitable distribution was to ‘recognize that when a marriage ends, 
each of the spouses . . . has a stake in and a right to a share of the marital assets accu-
mulated while it endured.’”). 
 18. See Am. L. Inst., supra note 7. 
 19. Id. at 19-21. 
 20. Id. at 20-21. 
 21. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 760, 770, 2550 (West 2014). 
 22. Grossman, supra note 17, at 609-14. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See id. at 608 (“Although hailed as a radical change, the equitable distribu-
tion statute was actually a political compromise between reformers who wanted to 
establish a system of equal distribution and those who did not want to change the 
property distribution scheme at all.”). 
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er in determining property distribution.  Clearly, the answer is not a simple 
one.  Because state laws give broad discretion to the courts, case law varies 
by state and does not provide clear criteria.  Moreover, in the last two dec-
ades, additional elements have been considered in the distribution of family 
property, such as earning capacity, reputation, and personal capital 25.   These 
elements contributed to changes in delineating property distribution and made 
the determination of guidelines even more complicated.  Certainly the an-
swers to the question of when it is appropriate to distribute property in an 
unequal manner are also impacted by how society views the family unit26 and 
the roles and commitments of each of the spouses in the family.27 
B.  The No-Fault Divorce Revolution 
Before examining how U.S. law addresses fault in property distribution, 
this Article begins with a brief description of the legal issue that precedes it 
and greatly impacts it – considerations of fault in divorce proceedings them-
selves.  For many years, the customary system of divorce gave consideration 
to the fault of each party.  Accordingly, a spouse was entitled to petition for 
dissolution of the marriage only if the spouse showed that the other spouse 
was at fault.28   That fault could be based on an extramarital relationship, de-
sertion, physical cruelty, and more.  A spouse was not entitled to petition for 
divorce only because he decided that he could no longer get along with or no 
longer loved his spouse.29  Paradoxically, even if both spouses reached such a 
conclusion, they were not entitled to file jointly for divorce unless one of 
them was found to be at fault.  These limitations reflected the strong public 
interest in preserving marriage as a foundation and a basis for societal devel-
opment.  30  This interest was also expressed in United States Supreme Court 
 
 25. See, e.g., Alicia Brokars Kelly, The Marital Partnership Pretense and Ca-
reer Assets: The Ascendancy of Self Over the Marital Community, 81 B.U. L. REV. 59 
(2001). 
 26. See Desnoyers v. Desnoyers, 530 N.Y.S.2d 906, 908 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) 
(“[Equitable distribution] was not designed to punish parties for their actions but to 
treat the marriage as an economic partnership and recognize each party’s contribution 
thereto.”). 
 27. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928 (Miss. 1994) (including each 
spouse’s contribution to the harmony and stability of the marriage as factors for equi-
table division of marital property). 
 28. Allen Parkman, Reforming Divorce Reform, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 379, 
379 (2001) (“For most of the history of the United States, it was difficult to dissolve a 
marriage because plaintiffs had to prove that their spouses had committed acts that 
constituted fault grounds for divorce.”). 
 29. JUDY PAREJKO, STOLEN VOWS: THE ILLUSION OF NO-FAULT DIVORCE AND 
THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN DIVORCE INDUSTRY 72 (2002). 
 30. Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 
1471 (1992). 
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decisions such as Maynard v. Hill.31  Narrowing the availability of divorce 
proceedings and limiting divorce to circumstances based upon fault reflected 
this interest.  32  
But the fault limitation raised a great amount of criticism throughout the 
United States.  33   Critics argued that the fault requirement causes hostile di-
vorce proceedings, intensifies the animosity between the spouses,  34  encour-
ages false testimony,35 leads spouses to create a “conspiracy” of fault in order 
to be granted a judgment for divorce,36 forces spouses to live together even 
though there is no meaningful relationship between them, and eventually 
brings about contempt for the legal process.37  In addition, sociological stud-
ies show that marriages can dissolve as a result of differences between spous-
es in their approaches to life, differences in personalities, or due to other dif-
ficulties, and do not necessarily dissolve as a result of one or more behavioral 
events.38 
As stated previously, family law is subject to the independent legislation 
of each state,39 although various national entities meet from time to time to 
formulate legislative proposals, which are proposed in multiple states.  Each 
state determines whether or not to adopt these proposals in their legislation.  
For example, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws (“NCCUSL”) appointed a committee to formulate a uniform code on 
 
 31. 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888) (“[Marriage] . . . is an institution, in the mainte-
nance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of 
the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor pro-
gress.”). 
 32. See Brown v. Brown, 281 S.W.2d 492, 498 (Tenn. 1955). 
 33. Peter Nash Swisher, The ALI Principles: A Farewell to Fault – But What 
Remedy for the Egregious Marital Misconduct of an Abusive Spouse?, 8 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL’Y 213, 213 (2001). 
 34. Lynn D. Wardle, Divorce Violence and the No-Fault Divorce Culture, 1994 
UTAH L. REV. 741, 741 (1994). 
 35. Parkman, supra note 28, at 384. 
 36. Michelle L. Evans, Note, Wrongs Committed During a Marriage: The Child 
that No Area of the Law Wants to Adopt, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 465, 473-74 
(2009).  Especially well known is the case of a woman who was hired by one hundred 
husbands to help them create documented instances of adultery in order to ensure 
their respective divorces.  Id. at 473. 
 37. MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, 
AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 191 (1989). 
 38. Michael Grossberg, How to Give the Present a Past? Family Law in the 
United States, 1950–2000, in CROSS CURRENTS: FAMILY LAW AND POLICY IN THE US 
AND ENGLAND 3, 17-18 (Sanford N. Katz, John Eekelaar & Mavis Maclean eds., 
2000). 
 39. See, e.g., Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899) (“[T]he whole subject 
of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of 
[each] state, and not to the laws of the United States.”); see also Boddie v. Connecti-
cut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971). 
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matters of marriage and divorce.40  This committee drafted the Uniform Mar-
riage and Divorce Act (“UMDA”), which was approved in 1970.41  This uni-
form code recommended transitioning to a system of no-fault divorce, di-
vorce after a separation period of 180 days, or divorce in the event of difficult 
differences of opinion.42  Concurrently, society’s view of the family unit 
transformed, and marriage was no longer seen as a single unit with one heart, 
but rather as a partnership between two individuals, each with his or her own 
desires and aspirations.  43   The UMDA, therefore, reflected the view that it 
should be possible to end a marriage according to the will and initiative of 
either of the spouses when the marriage no longer fulfilled the spouses’ needs 
and ambitions.44 
The no-fault divorce revolution swept through all the states.  California 
was the first state to legislate the system of no-fault divorce.45  One after an-
other, states incorporated the recommendations in their legislation, and by 
1985 every state had adopted no-fault divorce.  46   From that time on, every 
spouse has been entitled to file for a divorce judgment, even if the other 
spouse neither desires a divorce, nor is found to be at fault.  The terminology 
of fault in divorce proceedings was replaced with the terminology of lack of 
fault.  Terms such as “unbridgeable gaps,” “incompatibility,” “irreparable 
marital crisis,” and “willful separation for a period of time determined by 
law” became the relevant terms in divorce proceedings.  States hoped that the 
no-fault divorce revolution would make it easier for families in crisis and 
would expedite the dissolution process.  In many instances, no-fault divorce 
made discussions of fault at divorce proceedings unnecessary.47 
 
 40. See Marriage and Divorce Act, Model Summary, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. LAWS, http://www.uniformlawcommission.com/ActSu-
mmary.aspx?title=Marriage and Divorce Act, Model (last visited Mar. 7, 2015). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“[T]he marital couple is not 
an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two 
individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup.”). 
 44. See Bradford, supra note 1, at 611. 
 45. Evans, supra note 36, at 474. 
 46. Karen Turnage Boyd, The Tale of Two Systems: How Integrated Divorce 
Laws Can Remedy the Unintended Effects of Pure No-Fault Divorce, 12 CARDOZO 
J.L. & GENDER 609, 612 (2006) (“By 1985, all fifty states had some form of no-fault 
divorce in place.”). 
 47. See Mark Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Marriage as Contract, Opportunistic Vio-
lence, and Other Bad Arguments for Fault Divorce, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 719, 722-23 
(1997); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-5.1, 50-6 (West 2014).  But see Linda 
D. Elrod & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States, 27 FAM. L.Q. 515, 
661 (1994) (“Thirty states currently retain fault grounds while also affording no-fault 
alternatives.”). 
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C.  The No-Fault Divorce Revolution – The Shattered Dream 
About thirty years following the long awaited revolution, everyone was 
able to see and internalize the contribution that the revolution made to the rise 
in the divorce rate.  This increase in the divorce rate is not surprising since 
the institution of marriage can be dissolved today upon the sole initiative of 
either of the spouses, even if the other spouse’s behavior was exemplary.48  
The legal limitations that were previously imposed on the spouse who desired 
to end the marriage were removed and divorce procedures became relatively 
easy to accomplish.  The spouse who desires a divorce does not have to prove 
that the other spouse is at fault; it is sufficient for that spouse to state that he 
wants to end the marriage.  In comparison, the spouse who desires to continue 
the marriage, even if the other spouse is at fault, is in a detrimental position 
no matter how the matter is concluded.  On one hand, the committed spouse 
cannot avoid the dissolution of the marriage at the initiative of the spouse 
who is at fault.  On the other hand, if the spouse desires to initiate a divorce 
on her own, she cannot argue that the fault of the other spouse is a considera-
tion in her favor. 
This revolution, which made it easier to initiate a divorce proceeding, 
contributed to a lack of stability and certainty within a marriage.  49   The revo-
lution also contributed to the weakening of the social sanctions against di-
vorce.  Divorce proceedings did not become more moderate, as those who 
had demanded and awaited the revolution had hoped.  On the contrary, the 
proceedings following divorce continued to increase and became no less hos-
tile.  50   Moreover, sociological studies demonstrate that economic difficulties, 
poverty, medical problems, and a high death rate affect divorced spouses at a 
higher rate than married spouses.51  Thus, it can be argued that the increase in 
divorces following the no-fault divorce revolution has been harmful to the 
quality of life within this population.52 
In light of these negative phenomena, many American scholars began 
criticizing the no-fault divorce revolution and some of them even argue that it 
 
 48. See Wardle, supra note 34, at 766. 
 49. See Lynn D. Wardle, Marriage and Domestic Violence in the United States: 
New Perspectives About Legal Strategies to Combat Domestic Violence, 15 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 791, 801-05 (2003). 
 50. Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 BYU. 
L. REV. 79, 102 (1991).  It is also worth noting that approximately 90-95% of divorc-
es before the revolution were uncontested.  Id. at 103. 
 51. Stephen J. Bahr, Social Science Research on Family Dissolution: What It 
Shows and How It Might Be of Interest to Family Law Reformers, 4 J.L. & FAM. 
STUD. 5, 8-9 (2002). 
 52. See id.; see also Lynne Marie Kohm, Does Marriage Make Good Business? 
Examining the Notion of Employer Endorsement of Marriage, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 
563, 587 (2004). 
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has failed.53  Studies show that half of Americans today do not prefer the 
changed divorce laws and would prefer a return to restricting the availability 
of divorce.54  Certain states even adopted and legislated a new institution 
called “covenant marriage,” which entitles spouses, at their own initiative, to 
limit future divorce and allow for it only on the basis of fault.55  On the other 
hand, we are not certain whether the fault concept prior to the no-fault di-
vorce revolution, which did not enable spouses to divorce, really contributed 
to well-being in marital life.  Scholars continue to deal with this revolution: 
some oppose it while others support it.  56   However, for the purpose of this 
Article, this overview is sufficient.  The focus here is to understand the back-
ground and changes that took place in divorce proceedings with respect to 
fault and to analyze the new approaches that followed the removal of fault 
from divorce proceedings. 
D.  Fault in Property Distribution – The Laws in the United States 
Until 1968, all of the states weighed fault in determining family proper-
ty distribution, just as they weighed fault in their decisions to grant divorce.57  
With the conclusion of the no-fault divorce revolution, states considered 
whether to broaden the principles of no-fault and to apply them to property 
distribution as well.58  Articles 307 and 308 of the UMDA59 provided that 
 
 53. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON FAMILIES IN AM., INST. FOR AM. VALUES, MARRIAGE 
IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION 1 (1995), available at http://www.americ-
anvalues.org/search/item.php?id=24 (“The divorce revolution – the steady displace-
ment of a marriage culture by a culture of divorce and unwed parenthood – has failed.  
It has created terrible hardships for children, incurred unsupportable social costs, and 
failed to deliver on its promise of greater adult happiness.  The time has come to shift 
the focus of national attention from divorce to marriage and to rebuild a family cul-
ture based on enduring marital relationships.”). 
 54. See Parkman, supra note 28, at 398. 
 55. The states are Arkansas, Arizona, and Louisiana.  See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-
11-804 (West 2014); Lynne Marie Kohm, A Comparative Survey of Covenant Mar-
riage Proposals in the United States, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 31, 31-32, 39, 43 (1999-
2000). 
 56. See Bradford, supra note 1, at 607-08. 
 57. See Arnold v. Arnold, 174 P.2d 674, 676 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946) (“It obviously 
follows that where the divorce is granted on the more heinous ground of adultery as 
well as for extreme cruelty the amount awarded to the innocent party should be great-
er than if granted on the ground of cruelty alone.”); cf. Lynn D. Wardle, Beyond Fault 
and No-Fault in the Reform of Marital Dissolution Law, in RECONCEIVING THE 
FAMILY 9, 10 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006) (indicating that by 1970, a trend had 
developed “against considering fault in making . . . financial awards”). 
 58. Ira Mark Ellman, The Place of Fault in a Modern Divorce Law, 28 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 773, 782 (1996) (“Essentially all the American states moved to laws that allowed 
divorce on no-fault grounds in the 1970s and early 1980s, and as they did so they 
made choices about whether to apply the no-fault principle to property and alimony as 
well.  Few have revisited those choices.”). 
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both family property distribution and alimony be determined without consid-
ering inappropriate behavior during the marriage.  The same was set forth in 
the Uniform Marital Property Act (“UMPA”).  To those recommendations we 
can add the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Disso-
lution (“ALI Principles”).60  While the ALI Principles are not legislation, they 
have significant impact on state legislation.  61   The ALI Principles – built 
upon the UMDA and the UMPA recommendations – attempted to complete 
the no-fault revolution62 and determined that fault should not be considered in 
the distribution of family property.63  The rationale at the foundation of these 
rules is supported by three elements: (a) the uniformity and consistency that 
were obtained with the no-fault divorce revolution; (b) the fact that the sys-
tem of compensation through property was intended as compensation only for 
economic damage, and not as compensation for inappropriate behavior; and 
(c) the cancellation of immunity from claims between spouses, allowing for a 
tort claim to be brought against a spouse for inappropriate behavior during 
the marriage.64 
As mentioned, most states shifted to the system of equitable distribution.  
However, states differ in their frames of reference and that impacts the de-
fault; states that perceive family property as joint property adopt equal distri-
bution as a default in the equitable distribution system.  According to this 
approach, rather than transferring property from one spouse to another, the 
court divides the property between its owners.  These states tend not to weigh 
fault in property distribution: 
As common-law states moved from the traditional title system to the 
modern system of equitable distribution of marital property, some also 
internalized the community property view that the spouses jointly own 
property acquired during marriage through the labor of either of them.  
Under this view spousal claims on the property at divorce are legal ra-
ther than equitable: The court is not transferring assets from the true 
owner to his or her spouse in recognition of the claimant’s compelling 
 
 59. Unif. Marriage and Divorce Act §§ 307, 308(b), 9A U.L.A. 288-89, 446 
(1973). 
 60. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS, ch. 1, topic 2, I (2002) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES]; see also 
Ellman, supra note 58, at 776. 
 61. See Swisher, supra note 33, at 217 (“First, it is important to note that this 
particular ALI project is not a Restatement of the Law, but instead proposes various 
‘principles’ of family law which ‘give greater weight to emerging legal concepts than 
does a Restatement.’”). 
 62. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, Postmodern Marriage as Seen Through the Lens 
of the ALI’s “Compensatory Payments”, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra note 
57, at 249. 
 63. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 60; see also Evans, supra note 36, at 479 (“Ac-
cording to the American Law Institute, noneconomic fault – such as adultery, cruelty, 
or abandonment – is not a legitimate consideration during the divorce proceeding.”). 
 64. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 60. 
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equitable claims, but is rather dividing the property between its two 
joint owners, an exercise in which the marital misconduct of the par-
ties seems largely irrelevant.65 
In contrast, states that base equitable distribution on the traditional prin-
ciples of common law do not adopt equal distribution as a default, but rather 
adopt the separation of property as a default.66  According to this approach, 
the court transfers property from one spouse to another when determining 
property distribution.  Those states tend to consider fault during property 
division: 
There is indeed an apparent overlap between the fifteen states that al-
low consideration of fault in the allocation of property at divorce and 
those common law states that have been most resistant generally to 
moving from the common law marital property system to the marital 
property idea of joint ownership.67   
This Article will now examine how these recommendations, together 
with their various sources and the rationales for the system of family property 
distribution, actually influenced state laws regarding the consideration of 
fault in property distribution.  All states, in distributing property, tend to take 
into consideration economic misconduct that brings about a decrease in fami-
ly property.68  However, states differ in how they evaluate fault that does not 
harm family property, but instead harms family values.  Behaviors that are 
considered “fault” in this context include – but are not limited to – extramari-
tal relationships, abandonment, and physical and mental cruelty.69   
American legal scholars are divided over how to best categorize the 
states in these matters.  Professor Ellman, the Chief Reporter of the ALI Prin-
ciples, divides the states into five different categories according to the extent 
that each state considers fault during the distribution of family property and 
determination of alimony: 
1. Pure no-fault – twenty states do not consider fault at all in property 
distribution and determination of alimony.  These states adopted the 
approach of the UMDA. 
 
 65. Am. L. Inst., supra note 7, at 43.  This analysis is accepted by Professor 
Ellman, the Chief Reporter of the recommendations.  Ellman, supra note 58, at 783 
(“Joint ownership of marital property is nonetheless the divorce law vision of many 
common law states today, and their adoption of the joint ownership conception at 
dissolution has apparently encouraged a no-fault approach to its allocation.”). 
 66. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 60, ch. 1, topic 2, II. 
 67. See Ellman, supra note 58, at 783. 
 68. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse & Katharine T. Bartlett, Sex, Lies, and 
Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in a No-Fault Era, 82 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2528 
(1994); see also, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 438 S.E.2d 457, 458 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994). 
 69. Woodhouse & Bartlett, supra note 68, at 2532-33, 2538. 
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2. Pure no-fault property, almost pure no-fault alimony – five states 
do not consider fault at all in property distribution and almost never 
consider fault in determination of alimony. 
3. Almost pure no-fault – three states include the slight possibility of 
weighing fault in property distribution (such as in instances of severe 
violence or attempted murder). 
4. No-fault property, full-fault in alimony – seven states do not con-
sider fault at all in property distribution but do consider fault in deter-
mination of alimony. 
5. Full-fault – fifteen states grant the courts full discretion to consider 
any inappropriate spousal behavior in determining property distribu-
tion and the level of alimony.  70  
Following this analysis, Ellman indicates that twenty-five states reject 
the concept of fault both in divorce and property distribution proceedings.71  
In his opinion, the remaining states should also adopt this approach.72  
Ellman’s analysis has been accepted by several courts throughout the United 
States, and one court even indicated that the majority of American legal sys-
tems prohibit consideration of fault as a factor in property distribution.  73   On 
the contrary, other scholars continue to argue that the majority of states refuse 
to weigh fault.74 
Scholars that criticize Ellman’s analysis argue that his description does 
not reflect reality.  75   Peter Swisher, for example, states that if it is possible to 
identify a trend, the opposite trend should be endorsed – and fault should be 
considered in property distribution.  76   Swisher specifically disagrees with the 
analysis reflected in the ALI Principles and notes that most states consider 
 
 70. Ellman, supra note 58, at 776, 778-80.  This division into five categories was 
also adopted by the ALI.  ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 60, ch. 1, topic 2, II. 
 71. See Ellman, supra note 58, at 782. 
 72. Id. at 776.  The ALI endorsed this position.  ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 60. 
 73. Sparks v. Sparks, 485 N.W.2d 893, 909 (Mich. 1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); 
see Havell v. Islam, 718 N.Y.S.2d 807, 810 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000). 
 74. See Jeannette C. Griffo, How Fault Remains a Factor in Property Division 
Upon Divorce: An Analysis of Equitable Distribution in Michigan after Sparks v. 
Sparks, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 421, 450-51 (1994). 
 75. See June R. Carbone, Economics, Feminism, and the Reinvention of Alimony: 
A Reply to Ira Ellman, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1463 (1990); Carl E. Schneider, Rethinking 
Alimony: Marital Decisions and Moral Discourse, 1991 BYU L. REV. 197, 197-98 
(1991). 
 76. Peter Nash Swisher, Marriage and Some Troubling Issues with No-Fault 
Divorce, 17 REGENT U. L. REV. 243, 249 (2004-2005) (“Thus, if there is an arguable 
majority ‘trend’ today, it is to retain fault factors in divorce as one of many statutory 
factors that state courts will still consider in determining spousal support rights, the 
division of marital property, or both.”). 
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fault in property distribution.77  Between the extreme positions of Ellman and 
Swisher are more moderate positions that analyze and categorize the data in a 
more balanced way.  Thus, for example, writes Brett Turner: “[Out of the 
forty-nine] jurisdictions which permit the trial court to divide marital property 
equitably, twenty-seven do not permit consideration of fault that has no eco-
nomic impact.”78  Lynn Wardle has a similar view: “[T]hirty states allow 
consideration of marital misconduct in both alimony and property disputes.”79 
Part II of this Article analyzes the aforementioned positions and demon-
strates that the differences among scholars’ categorization of the states’ 
treatment of fault in the dissolution context arise not only from their analysis 
of the factual data but also from their moral views of the family structure and 
its role in modern society. 
It is essential to emphasize that fault remains only one of the factors that 
is considered in property distribution.  Thus, for example, the Michigan Court 
of Appeals reversed a lower court decision that gave a woman only a quarter 
of the marital property, when the decision was based on the woman’s extra-
marital relationship.80  The Michigan Court of Appeals stated that the lower 
court gave too much weight to fault and failed to consider other factors.81  In 
Missouri, a court awarded a woman 63% of the property after it became clear 
that the husband had a child from an extramarital relationship.82  Similarly, 
the Court of Appeals of Virginia granted a woman a larger portion of proper-
ty due to her husband’s many years of adultery, although the court considered 
additional factors.  83  
 
 77. Id. at 258 (“What these commentators largely ignore, however, is that thirty-
five years after the so-called no-fault divorce ‘revolution,’ only a small minority of 
states – about fifteen – are ‘true’ no-fault jurisdictions, while a majority of states still 
retain alternative fault grounds for divorce, and still consider marital fault factors in 
determining spousal support and the distribution of marital property on divorce.  In-
deed, forty-two states still continue to evaluate a spouse’s noneconomic contributions 
to the marriage and the well-being of the family, in spite of the [ALI Principles’] 
arguments to the contrary.”).  Professor Goldberg analyzes the division of states in a 
similar way.  See BARTH H. GOLDBERG, VALUATION OF DIVORCE ASSETS § 1:34 (re-
vised ed. 2005) (“Unfortunately, fault remains a major issue for consideration in 
many jurisdictions, even though it was presumed that with the passage of the Uniform 
Property Act its importance would become insignificant.  However, this presumption 
has proved fallacious.  In fact, as of 1985 only seventeen states have statutes express-
ly excluding marital fault from the factors to be considered upon dissolution, while 
sixteen states now permit it to be a factor among others to be considered, and only six 
remain silent on the subject.”). 
 78. Brett R. Turner, The Role of Marital Misconduct in Dividing Property Upon 
Divorce, 15 DIVORCE LITIG. 117, 117 (2003), available at http://www.divorcesource
.com/research/dl/division/03jul117.shtml. 
 79. See Wardle, supra note 57, at 15. 
 80. Sparks v. Sparks, 485 N.W.2d 893, 901-02 (Mich. 1992). 
 81. Id. at 901-03. 
 82. Huber v. Huber, 682 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). 
 83. O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin, 458 S.E.2d 323, 324-26 (Va. Ct. App. 1995). 
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In contrast, in other states, fault that is detrimental to the spousal rela-
tionship – such as cruelty, desertion, adultery, or humiliation – is not a rele-
vant consideration in determining the equitable distribution of family proper-
ty.  84   In those states, inappropriate spousal behavior is not a basis for punish-
ing one spouse or awarding more property to the spouse who was harmed.85  
Swisher argues that, indeed, in many states the tendency is to ignore fault.86  
Thus, for example, in New York, fault was taken into account only in cases 
that “shock the conscience of the court.”87  However, the courts in New York 
agree that an extramarital relationship is not the type of behavior that “shocks 
the conscious of the court,” and therefore should not be considered as a factor 
in property distribution.88 
Sometimes, courts within the same state disagree as to whether the court 
should consider extramarital relationships in the property distribution context.  
Contrary to the New York decision referenced in the previous paragraph, the 
Virginia Court of Appeals ruled against the consideration of a husband’s long 
extramarital relationship when the affair brought about the dissolution of the 
marriage but did not involve economic misconduct.89  Ultimately, the court 
affirmed the lower court’s decision, granting the husband 65% of the family 
 
 84. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Muhammad, 108 P.3d 779, 780-81 (Wash. 2005); 
Warner v. Warner, 807 A.2d 607, 613 (Me. 2002); Hartland v. Hartland, 777 P.2d 
636, 641-42 (Alaska 1989); Anderson v. Anderson, 230 S.E.2d 272, 273, 275-76 (Ga. 
1976), superseded by statute, Divorce and Alimony – Procedures Changed, 1977 Ga. 
Laws 1253, 1257, as recognized in Davidson v. Davidson, 257 S.E.2d 269 (Ga. 
1979); Sirek v. Sirek, 693 N.W.2d 896, 900 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005); Thompson v. 
Thompson, 811 N.E.2d 888, 921-22 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); see also Dvorak v. Dvorak, 
693 N.W.2d 646, 652-53 (N.D. 2005); Steiner v. Steiner, 687 N.W.2d 740, 742-43 
(Wis. Ct. App. 2004). 
 85. See, e.g., Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 820 (Wyo. 1984) (citing 
Paul v. Paul, 616 P.2d 707, 715 (Wyo. 1980)); Young v. Young, 609 S.W.2d 758, 762 
(Tex. 1980); Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871, 872 (Utah 1979); Wilberscheid v. Wilber-
scheid, 252 N.W.2d 76, 81 (Wis. 1977). 
 86. See Swisher, supra note 33, at 224-25 (“Therefore, the current judicial trend 
in many states is that most judges tend to ignore or severely limit the ultimate effect 
of fault-based statutory factors in divorce, except in serious or egregious circumstanc-
es.”); see also Tarro v. Tarro, 485 A.2d 558, 561 (R.I. 1984); Perlberger v. Perlberger, 
626 A.2d 1186, 1195 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Platt v. Platt, 728 S.W.2d 542, 543-44 
(Ky. Ct. App. 1987).  But see Thames v. Thames, 477 N.W.2d 496, 503 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1991) (citing Burkey v. Burkey, 471 N.W.2d 631, 634-35 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1991)). 
 87. O’Brien v. O’Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 589-90 (N.Y. 1985) (citing Blickstein v. 
Blickstein, 472 N.Y.S.2d 110 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)); see also Havell v. Islam, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000) (quoting O’Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 589-90). 
 88. Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 510 N.Y.S.2d 659, 662 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); see 
also Nolan v. Nolan, 486 N.Y.S.2d 415 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985). 
 89. Aster v. Gross, 371 S.E.2d 833, 836 (Va. Ct. App. 1988) (“Circumstances 
that lead to the dissolution of the marriage but have no effect upon marital property, 
its value, or otherwise are not relevant . . . [and] need not be considered.”). 
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property and explaining that he earned most of it as an orthopedic surgeon.90  
An additional Virginia court followed this approach and ruled that adultery is 
not a relevant consideration in property distribution.  91   The same conclusion 
was reached in West Virginia.92  Similarly, courts in Florida and North Caro-
lina ruled that adultery should not be considered in property distribution but 
should be considered in the determination of alimony.  93  
II.  EXTRAMARITAL RELATIONSHIPS AND PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION – 
THE NORMATIVE VIEW 
Part I of this Article examined the role of fault – specifically extramari-
tal relationships – in property distribution regimes.  This part discusses the 
theoretical basis for weighing extramarital relationships in property distribu-
tion.  Within this part, the four sections progress step-by-step: the first exam-
ines the moral argument; the second presents a dilemma facing the moral 
argument; the third reviews the impact of a lack of clear guidelines for weigh-
ing extramarital relationships in property distribution; and the fourth discuss-
es which legal field should deal with the fault of spouses. 
A.  The Moral Argument 
As previously stated, the disagreement among scholars in classifying 
states’ consideration of fault in family property distribution is not only factual 
but also reflects underlying moral and ideological perspectives.  This discus-
sion centers upon the role of the family unit and the weight of moral argu-
ments in family law.  On one side of the discussion is Ellman, who argues 
that most of the states exclude consideration of fault from property distribu-
tion.94  The proposals suggested by Ellman are also incorporated in the ALI 
Principles.  On the other side of the discussion are the many other scholars 
 
 90.  Id. at 835-36. 
 91. See Gamer v. Gamer, 429 S.E.2d 618, 622 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Aster, 
371 S.E.2d at 836) (finding that any adultery committed by the husband “had no eco-
nomic impact upon the parties’ property, nor did it affect the value of the marital 
assets”). 
 92. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-7-103 (West 2014) (mandating that courts presume 
equal division of marital property between the parties but allowing alterations to such 
distribution “without regard to any attribution of fault”). 
 93. See Tuller v. Tuller, 469 So. 2d 212, 213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (Cowart, 
J., dissenting); cf. Shoffner v. Shoffner, 371 S.E.2d 749, 751 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) 
(reasoning that the court’s consideration of one party’s “failure to assist in the compi-
lation and valuation of marital property during litigation” – thereby causing the op-
posing party to incur additional expenses – was “equivalent to the proper considera-
tion of marital misconduct . . . related to the economic condition of the marriage as a 
factor in making the distributive award”). 
 94. See Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1, 23 (1989); 
Ellman, supra note 58, at 807. 
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who disagree with Ellman.  Morse, for example, argues that Ellman does not 
give credence to the moral aspects and instead favors only the consideration 
of the economic aspects.95  Morse further asserts that the consideration of 
fault is an “excellent tool” both for encouraging appropriate behavior and for 
deterring inappropriate behavior.96  In his opinion, most of society views ex-
tramarital relationships as inappropriate behavior, and he argues that a finan-
cial cost to the individual at fault could disincentivize such behavior.97  As 
expressed in his words: 
. . . fault provides an excellent tool to encourage the type of behavior 
society believes to be appropriate in marriage, and to discourage that 
behavior which society deems to be inappropriate.  It seems that most 
people would at least agree that engaging in adultery, cruelty, or de-
sertion is not the sort of sharing behavior which marriage should have 
to endure.  In order to provide a disincentive for such behavior, there 
should be concomitant post-divorce financial consequences for engag-
ing in inappropriate behavior.98 
Karen Boyd adds that it is morally wrong for an adulterous spouse to re-
tain half of the property.99  Boyd argues that this result sends a clear message 
to society that adultery is acceptable behavior: “. . . when a spouse who 
commits adultery leaves the marriage with half or more of the family’s assets, 
as may occur within the current pure no-fault schemes, an injustice is done.  
The message is clear – it is acceptable to have an extramarital affair.”100 
Laura Bradford writes that reconsideration of fault in divorce proceed-
ings, as well as in property distribution, meets the customary expectations of 
society: “[Reintroducing the fault concept] back into divorce [as well as] into 
the division of assets and [spousal support] after divorce satisfies the popular 
expectation that society will reward those who observe their marital vows and 
commitments.”101  Lawrence Golden adds that even if one agrees – in theory 
– that fault should not be considered in property distribution, legislators and 
judges generally still give consideration to fault and award property accord-
ingly: 
In theory fault or misconduct which is not related to the economic 
conditions of the parties should not be germane to a division of prop-
erty. . . .  Nonetheless, there is a strong feeling among legislators and 
judges that a “bad person” should not be rewarded, and the strength of 
 
 95. See Morse, supra note 12, at 634 (discussing other scholars’ views on 
Ellman’s theory). 
 96. Id. at 640-41. 
 97. Id. at 641. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See Boyd, supra note 46, at 615. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Bradford, supra note 1, at 621. 
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this belief sometimes tempers rigorous adherence to abstract princi-
ples.102 
In addition, the weighing of fault in property distribution may lessen the 
negative results of the no-fault divorce revolution – a revolution that has left 
the weaker spouse exposed to the danger of divorce without being able to 
prevent it: “As states began to adopt no-fault divorce laws, marriage was 
transformed from a permanent relationship into a relationship terminable at-
will.  The reformers had to make some provisions for the economic security 
of the family members outside of marriage.”103 
Courts have rejected the argument that consideration of fault in divorce 
is based on religious rationales and thereby unconstitutional.104  Instead, 
courts reason that adultery harms individuals of all religions, including those 
who do not practice religion at all.105  This argument adds to, and strengthens, 
the universal moral position that disapproves of extramarital relationships.  
Swisher joins this approach and argues that despite the apparent abandonment 
of fault in the no-fault divorce revolution, much writing about the subject of 
fault still exists.106  In his opinion, this continued discussion shows that the 
moral element is still relevant in the context of family.107  Swisher also indi-
cates that legislatures and courts in most states still consider spousal respon-
sibility in the dissolution of a marriage.  108   He argues that the refusal to con-
sider fault comes from a different view of the family and its roles: 
Indeed, if contemporary marriage is viewed today as a shared partner-
ship with important economic and noneconomic expectations, then a 
“true” no-fault divorce regime, as proposed in the Principles, reduces 
marriage on dissolution only to impersonal and unrealistic economic 
calculations, and refuses to consider many important nonmonetary 
marital contributions to the well-being of the family.109 
At the same time, extramarital relationships have lost the negative label 
they have been given in the past.  In the name of new values (privacy, auton-
omy and freedom), the important moral protections of the family were 
harmed.  States that adopted these values implemented a pure approach of no-
fault divorce, which imposed a great burden on the “innocent” spouse in 
 
 102. LAWRENCE J. GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY 255 (1st ed. 
1983). 
 103. Boyd, supra note 46, at 620-21. 
 104. See, e.g., Waite v. Waite, 64 S.W.3d 217, 219 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001); Wikoski 
v. Wikoski, 513 A.2d 986, 986 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). 
 105. Arnold H. Loewy, Morals Legislation and the Establishment Clause, 55 
ALA. L. REV. 159, 166 (2003). 
 106. See Swisher, supra note 33, at 220-21. 
 107. See id. at 219-21. 
 108. Id. at 220. 
 109. Id. at 221. 
19
Cohen: Extramarital Relationships and the Theoretical Rationales for the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
150 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
property distribution and determination of alimony.110  According to Swisher, 
these legal systems are detrimental to the “innocent” spouse in two ways: 
first, they prevent him or her from using the other spouse’s moral fault as a 
basis for fair negotiation, ultimately harming bargaining power;111 second, 
they treat fault and no-fault in the same way, which sends a social message 
that the marital relationship does not demand commitment.112 
B.  A Dilemma Facing the Moral Argument 
In response to the abovementioned writers, Ellman argues that the moral 
argument relies on the assumption that the cause of a divorce can be deter-
mined.  However, that cause is not easily identified when the investigation is 
based on a moral criterion, which is neither scientific nor exact.  Consider, for 
example, that some spouses are willing to forgive their partners for extramari-
tal relationships and choose to continue their marriage, while others are not 
willing to do so.  Therefore, when the family unit dissolves following an ex-
tramarital relationship, the question to be asked is whether the divorce is the 
fault of the spouse who engaged in an extramarital relationship or the spouse 
who could not tolerate it.  In other words, is the “cause” of divorce the behav-
ior itself or perhaps the other spouse’s intolerance of the behavior?  Further, 
couldn’t the adultery that eventually brought about divorce be a reaction to a 
failed relationship, and therefore not the “cause” of divorce?  In grappling 
with these questions, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed a decision that 
considered a wife’s adulterous relationship in determining property distribu-
tion.113  The court explained that in the complex marriage relationship, one 
spouse may be acting in response to the actions of the other, so it is impossi-
ble to determine who is at fault in ending the marriage.114 
Additional questions arise: should only intentional fault be considered or 
perhaps unintentional fault as well, such as infertility or mental illness?  
When one spouse decides to divorce because of the other spouse’s illness, 
who will be considered the wrongdoer?  Similarly, how will matters such as 
the refusal of a spouse to participate in relationship counseling or individual 
treatment be considered?  From another perspective, evidentiary complica-
tions may arise: in some instances, identifying the “cause” demands extensive 
 
 110. See, e.g., Mosbarger v. Mosbarger, 547 So. 2d 188, 189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1989) (completely adopting the no-fault divorce system to such an extent that it did 
not consider fault in a case in which the wife attempted to murder her spouse); In re 
Marriage of Cihak, 416 N.E.2d 701, 702 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (refusing to consider 
husband’s murder of wife as a factor in property division). 
 111. See Swisher, supra note 33, at 222. 
 112. See id. at 221 (citing Morse, supra note 12, at 640-41). 
 113. Chalmers v. Chalmers, 320 A.2d 478, 480, 484 (N.J. 1974). 
 114. Id. at 482; see also ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 60, ch. 1, topic 2, Reporter’s 
Note a.2.c (“N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-23.1 governs the distribution of property.  Mari-
tal misconduct is not among the factors the statute directs the court to consider, alt-
hough the court is empowered to consider ‘any other factor it deems relevant.’”). 
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evidence from family members and friends, medical evidence, and third party 
evidence, all of which can complicate and prolong the divorce proceedings.  
Inquiry into these issues requires looking at internal family matters such as 
the intimate relationship between the spouses, thereby infringing on the 
spouses’ privacy. 
All of these questions raise doubt about a court’s ability to determine the 
true origin of fault and show that when a court determines who is at fault for 
bringing the marriage to an end, the court does not determine the cause solely 
responsible for it but, instead, evaluates the relative moral failures of both 
spouses.  In actuality, the decision of the court only evaluates who is more at 
fault and not who caused the marriage to end.  The complexity of family rela-
tionships makes this evaluation difficult.  As the affection between parties 
fades, they are less willing to tolerate each other, making the determination of 
fault all the more difficult.  It is doubtful whether the judicial process is the 
appropriate tool for investigating the real cause for the separation of spouses.  
Furthermore, property distribution according to fault could create an incen-
tive for the harmed spouse to dissolve the marriage in order to hurt the spouse 
that breached marital trust.  In so doing, the harmed spouse might neglect 
other considerations that should be protected, such as the interest of the chil-
dren and the preservation of the family unit.  In light of these considerations, 
it is unsurprising that some courts are unwilling to weigh the relative fault 
while determining property distribution.115 
Even when a court determines who is more at fault, it is unclear which 
criteria it uses in doing so.  Without clear and defined guidelines, the court 
places responsibility on behavior that is not a civil wrong.  If the behavior 
that the court punishes is a civil wrong, then tort law provides defined com-
pensation.  If not, then the use of the word “cause” is imprecise. 
C.  Lack of Guidelines Leads to Judicial Arbitrariness 
The ALI Principles also argue that the traditional rules of fault require 
exceptional reliance on judicial discretion.116  This reliance on judicial discre-
tion is due to a lack of guidelines regarding the appropriate standard of be-
havior and its economic consequences.117  While this problem is relevant to 
all areas of the law, its significance increases when the topic of discussion is 
one of morals and values.  Thus, the consideration of fault hinders the attain-
ment of greater uniformity and predictability in judicial decisions.  These 
values are fundamental to every legal system: 
 
 115. Lutz v. Lutz, 485 So. 2d 1174, 1177 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986) (citing Dobbs v. 
Dobbs, 452 So. 2d 872 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) (“However, we do not find it necessary 
for the court to examine each incident of misconduct to determine who was more at 
fault.  If there is testimony of fault from both parties, the trial court does not have to 
determine the relative fault of the parties when making the property division.”)). 
 116. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 60, ch. 1, topic 2, Reporter’s Note a.5.b. 
 117. Id. 
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The traditional marital-fault rule requires extraordinary reliance on tri-
al-court discretion.  Neither the standard of misconduct, nor its dollar 
consequences, are much bounded by any rule.  While in principle the 
trial court’s decision can be reviewed for “abuse of discretion,” rever-
sals are rare. . . .  The traditional fault rule is thus inconsistent with a 
major theme of these Principles, an effort to improve the consistency 
and predictability of trial-court decisions.118 
States that consider fault fail to formulate clear guidelines for the courts.  
In Missouri, for example, a guideline set by the court in Burtscher instructed 
courts to consider behavior that “throws upon the other party marital burdens 
beyond the norms to be expected in the marital relationship.”119  Despite this 
guideline, the Missouri Court of Appeals refused to reverse a decision from a 
lower court that viewed a husband’s adultery as morally equivalent to the 
insistence of the wife to play Bingo four nights a week.120   Rather than apply 
the guideline, the court took the wife’s behavior into consideration and dis-
missed the appeal.121  The ALI Principles argue further that, as long as there 
is no defined economic harm, consideration of fault grants unlimited judicial 
discretion, and, in that regard, exposes the decisions in these matters to the 
subjective view of each judge.  122  
Swisher agrees with these arguments, and explains that they can be ex-
tended to all areas of law: there is no way to prevent the involvement of the 
personal view of the judge, even where clear and uniform standards are ap-
plied.123  Family court judges implement a great deal of judicial discretion.  
Usually their daily experience guides them to reach fair distribution of family 
property.124  It is not a question of unlimited discretion, as legislation in thir-
ty-six states clearly defines which parameters are to be considered when de-
termining property distribution.125  In addition, the courts are guided and re-
viewed by the courts of appeals. 
Actually, courts encounter inherent problems with the use of even clear 
guidelines.  On one hand, determination of clear guidelines is detrimental to 
the necessary flexibility of decisions.  On the other hand, a lack of clear 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Burtscher v. Burtscher, 563 S.W.2d 526, 527 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (“[T]he 
conduct factor becomes important when the conduct of one party to the marriage is 
such that it throws upon the other party marital burdens beyond the norms to be ex-
pected in the marital relationship.”). 
 120. See id. at 527-28. 
 121. Id. (noting that “[i]t is unnecessary and probably impossible to lay down any 
precise guidelines for the weight to be given to the conduct factor”). 
 122. See Ellman, supra note 58, at 790. 
 123. See Swisher, supra note 33, at 219-23. 
 124. Id. at 223-24. 
 125. Id. at 224 n.64; see also Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of 
the Year in Family Law: Century Ends with Unresolved Issues, 33 FAM. L.Q. 865 
(2000). 
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guidelines leads to gaps in judicial decisions that reflect each judge’s personal 
views about what constitutes fault in a spousal relationship.  In the absence of 
guidelines, the judge is empowered to use family law as a tool for punishing 
behavior that society has chosen not to criminalize.126  Ellman asserts that 
society still does not deem it proper to punish inappropriate spousal behavior 
because there is no broad consensus regarding the definition of such behav-
ior.127  As an additional concern, laws are not gender neutral: in states that 
take fault into consideration, the legal consequences of a wife’s adultery are 
greater than those of a husband’s adultery.128 
D.  Which Field of Law Should Deal with Extramarital Relationships? 
If the purpose of the consideration of extramarital relationships in the 
marital dissolution context is to punish the “guilty” or compensate the victim, 
then tort law is well-equipped for that purpose.  Claims between spouses were 
originally blocked by rules of spousal immunity.  However, in conjunction 
with the no-fault revolution, states began to recognize tort claims between 
former spouses: 
The obvious model for such a system is the tort law, which provides 
compensation for harms and also permits punitive damages in certain 
circumstances.  And indeed, since no-fault’s rise in the 1970’s, the tort 
law has changed so that most states now recognize claims between 
former spouses that were previously excluded by blanket rules of 
spousal immunity.129 
Ellman states that the courts tried to avoid the punitive nature of weigh-
ing fault by arguing that it is only a matter of monetary compensation for 
economic damage caused to the spouse by the transition from one economic 
unit to two separate units.130  However, this argument is unfounded because 
the courts that consider fault actually reward good behavior and punish the 
wrongdoer rather than compensate one spouse for damage caused by the oth-
er spouse.131  Furthermore, Ellman’s proposal to rely upon tort law is prob-
lematic.  Experience shows that the number of such claims is very small, and 
 
 126. See Ellman, supra note 58, at 787. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See, e.g., id. at 787 n.30 (“Kentucky ([wife’s] adultery may reduce alimony 
award, but [husband’s] adultery cannot be the basis for increasing it); . . . North Da-
kota (trial court properly allocated 83 percent of property to [husband] after 19-year 
marriage, where [wife] guilty of adultery).”). 
 129. Id. at 786.  In the summary of his article, Ellman concludes that half of the 
states do not grant alimony on the basis of fault, and more than half do not consider it 
in determining property distribution.  Id. at 807.  Apparently the reason is that the 
fault can be dealt with in tort law or in criminal law.  Id. at 807-08. 
 130. Id. at 788. 
 131. See id. 
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those that result in compensation are even more rare.132  Couples generally 
object to continuing divorce proceedings with a tort proceeding for two rea-
sons: first, the complication of the tort proceedings; second, a lack of capital 
for compensation of the injured party since insurance companies do not cover 
intentional damage.133  The addition of a tort claim to a family law proceed-
ing will also raise, among other issues, the question of which procedure 
should be followed.  134   
Moreover, even where extramarital relationships are a significant factor 
in spousal separation, there is no defined remedy for either spouse in tort 
law.135  An absence of a specific statutory remedy imposes a heavy burden on 
the spouse who has been harmed and attempts to obtain compensation from 
the other spouse: 
Neither tort nor criminal law provides an adequate remedy for egre-
gious marital misconduct[.]  Finally, the absence of any fault-based 
statutory relief for egregious marital misconduct may place an almost 
insurmountable burden on an abused spouse to obtain compensatory 
relief from an abusive spouse.  This serious problem is illustrated in a 
number of cases in a minority of states that have adopted a “pure” or 
“true” no-fault regime, where nonfinancial marital fault no longer 
plays any significant role in determining divorce grounds and defens-
es, spousal support awards, or the equitable distribution of marital 
property.136 
In light of the above, Swisher believes that a state that considers adopt-
ing the ALI Principles should at the same time weigh the considerations of 
fault.137  In his opinion, this matter should not be dealt with in tort law be-
cause family law is sufficiently developed to address these types of damages, 
and there is no need to reinvent laws that already exist.138 
III.  ISRAELI LAW – EXTRAMARITAL RELATIONSHIPS 
A.  Extramarital Relationships Under a Joint Property Regime 
The Dror ruling, handed down at the end of the 1970s, serves as the 
primary basis for excluding the consideration of extramarital relationships 
 
 132. Swisher, supra note 33, at 228 (quoting Robert G. Spector, Marital Torts: 
The Current Legal Landscape, 33 FAM. L.Q. 745, 762 (1999)). 
 133. Id. (quoting Spector, supra note 132, at 762). 
 134. See Woodhouse & Bartlett, supra note 68, at 2566  (“Tort claims raise tricky 
questions of res judicata and collateral estoppel, the right to a jury trial, overlapping 
recoveries, and limitations on damages.”). 
 135. See Evans, supra note 36, at 494-95. 
 136. See Swisher, supra note 76  , at 254. 
 137. See id. 
 138. See Swisher, supra note 33, at 227-28 (citing Ellman, supra note 94). 
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from family property distribution in Israel.139  This case concerned a couple 
who lived in marital harmony for about three years.140  The husband argued 
that their family life started deteriorating when his wife became intimate with 
other men.141  Therefore, he argued that joint property rights could neither be 
established by their marital relationship nor by an implied agreement between 
the spouses.142  The Israel Supreme Court rejected this argument: 
Abandoning the house or adultery might create a rift between spouses 
and in this way terminate the sharing of property, but [the spouses] are 
not retroactively punished for [these actions] by taking away joint 
property rights.  An explicit rule expressing this idea is found in the 
United States: CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM 75 42.143 
This decision gave no reason why extramarital relationships should not 
be considered.  The reference to the explicit rule in the United States is puz-
zling since the law in the United States is complex and varies from state to 
state.  The minority opinion in the Dror case stated that, even if the wife was 
adulterous, her husband forgave her after he found out about the adultery.144  
Though this fact made this case easily distinguishable, later courts relied on 
this decision.  Indeed, this important distinction in the Dror decision did not 
prevent later decisions from relying upon it as binding precedent.145 
However, with respect to external and personal property owned by one 
spouse prior to the couple’s relationship, one finds an opposite ruling: extra-
marital relationships will bring about the exclusion of such property from 
joint property.146  Consider, for example, the case of Salem, which dealt with 
common law spouses to whom the joint property rule also generally ap-
plies.147  Mrs. Salem admitted to having an intimate extramarital relation-
ship.148  The court determined that this relationship did not cancel the joint 
 
 139. CA 264/77 Dror v. Dror 32(1) PD 829, 832 [1978] (Isr.). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id.  In some American jurisdictions, however, it is difficult to argue against 
an argument of fault with the counterargument that the parties continued to live to-
gether after the event under discussion.  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-52 
(West 2015); Pavel v. Pavel, 495 A.2d 1113, 1114 (1985) (holding that the trial court 
erred in hearing only evidence related to the final event contributing to the dissolution 
of the marriage and in suppressing evidence of earlier such events on the basis that 
the parties had reconciled). 
 143. Dror, 32(1) PD 829, at 832. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See, e.g., CA 819/94 Levi v. Levi 50(1) PD 300, 304 [1996] (Isr.); HCJ 
1135/02 Vazgial v. The Supreme Rabbinical Court 56(1) PD 14, 24 [2002] (Isr.).  
 146. CA 4385/91 Salem v. Carmi 51(1) PD 337 [1997] (Isr.). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
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property rule regarding property acquired during the relationship, but it did 
not allow for the consideration of external property as joint property.149 
Another case involving external property is the case of Anonymous A.  150   
In that case, a couple and their children lived in an apartment that belonged to 
the husband before the couple met.151  The rabbinical court152 ruled that the 
woman was not entitled to support payments, a portion of the apartment, nor 
any other residence, because she was a “rebellious wife” who had continuous-
ly betrayed her husband.153  The woman petitioned the Israel Supreme Court 
and argued that, according to the joint property principles, she was entitled to 
half of the apartment.154  In an opinion given by Chief Justice Barak, the Isra-
el Supreme Court dismissed her petition.155  The court determined that ongo-
ing betrayal undermines the basis for harmony, and, therefore, prevented the 
application of joint property principles to external property.156  However, it 
did not cancel the joint rights acquired during the marriage.157 
An additional case for consideration is Draham.158  The abovementioned 
decisions dealt with whether Israeli law requires the transfer of half the fami-
ly property to the spouse who is not the registered owner – even though that 
spouse was disloyal.  The courts determined that family property should be 
transferred but external property should not.  The Draham decision, in con-
trast, dealt with the question of whether to apply the rules of joint property to 
the external property of the disloyal spouse.159  In a majority opinion, Judge 
Dorner determined that the rules of joint property should be applied in their 
complete scope – including property acquired prior to the marriage.160  She 
argued that in harmonious marriages that last for many years, this sort of 
property usually becomes absorbed into joint property.161  It is difficult to 
avoid the impression that a desire to punish the disloyal spouse affected 
Dorner since, in this case, the basis for joint external property rested on a 
very weak rationale.  Even spouses living in harmony do not tend to see an 
 
 149. Id. 
 150. HCJ 3995/00 Anonymous v. The Supreme Rabbinical Court 56(6) PD 883, 
888 [2002] (Isr.) [hereinafter Anonymous A]. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Under Israeli Law, family matters are under the parallel jurisdictions of the 
civil court and the religious court in which the presiding rabbinic judges are experts in 
religious law.  Ayelet Blecher-Prigat & Benjamin Shmueli, The Interplay Between 
Tort Law and Religious Family Law: The Israeli Case, 26 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
279, 280-81 (2009). 
 153. Anonymous A, 56(6) PD 883. 
 154. See id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158.  CA 1880/95 Draham v. Draham 50(4) PD 865, 876 [1997] (Isr.). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See id. at 877. 
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external asset acquired by one spouse before marriage as a corporate asset, 
yet here Justice Dorner stated that an external asset will be shared despite a 
shaky relationship. 
B.  Balancing of Resources – The Property Relations Law 
In 1973, the Property Relations Law was enacted in Israel.162  The law 
was intended to apply to all couples that entered into marriages after 1974.163  
Under this law, the Israeli legislature established the system of delayed shar-
ing.  This system creates an absolute separation of property throughout the 
entire marriage.  The property is divided between the spouses only in the 
event of divorce or upon the death of one spouse.164  This arrangement is 
known as the “balancing of resources” in which sharing is obligatory.165  
“Balancing resources” is sharing the value of the property, as opposed to 
ownership rights, and it is delayed until the end of the marriage.166  This shar-
ing arrangement is implemented by evaluating the property of each spouse.167  
The spouse who has more property registered in his or her name pays half of 
the difference in value to the spouse in whose name less property is regis-
tered.  168   Section 8(2) of the Property Relations Law provides that if the court 
finds “special circumstances” it is authorized to determine that the balancing 
of the property value not be half and half but rather some other proportion.169 
In the case of Anonymous B, the court considered whether extramarital 
relationships are “special circumstances” – justifying a deviation from the 
“balancing of resources” rule.  170   The rabbinical court held that adultery is 
included in “special circumstances” and that the wife should not be granted 
portions of the property that were accumulated in the husband’s name.171  
Because issues of property should be resolved according to civil law, the rab-
binical court could not base its opinion on punishment under religious law 
and, therefore, provided the following explanation: 
Because of the economic results of divorce due to adultery, the injured 
spouse will be forced, as a result of the unilateral adulterous behavior, 
to build another home for himself, to remarry and also to literally pur-
chase another home . . . the economic responsibility imposed upon the 
injured party entitles him to leniency in the balancing of resources to 
 
 162. The Spouses Property Relations Law, 5733-1973, 27 LSI 276 (1973) (Isr.). 
 163. Id. at § 14. 
 164. Id. at §§ 5-6. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See id. 
 168. See id. 
 169. Id. at § 8(2). 
 170. HCJ 8928/06 High Court of Justice, Anonymous v. The Supreme Rabbinical 
Court (Oct. 8, 2008) (Isr.). [hereinafter Anonymous B]. 
 171. Id. 
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his benefit, whether from rights that were accumulated before the 
adultery or afterwards.172 
The wife petitioned the Israel Supreme Court, which relied upon the 
Dror ruling and decided to reverse the decision of the rabbinical court: “The 
dissolution of every marriage has broad economic impacts.  The need to 
‘build another home’ is not unique only to couples whose marriage broke up 
because of adultery.  This is the need of many of the couples whose marriages 
have come to an end.”  173  
Another argument was made by Judge Rivlin in the case of Anonymous 
B: 
One cannot deal with the fault of one of the parties through economic 
damage in property distribution.   It is often difficult to speak in terms 
of “fault” in this circumstance.  The dissolution of marriage is the re-
sult of complex circumstances and adultery in itself does not make one 
of the spouses solely at fault.  174  
It seems that this is the only argument in the Israeli court decisions for 
not weighing extramarital relationships in property distribution, and it is 
compelling.  This argument also parallels one of the central arguments com-
monly advanced in the United States, as discussed above, which this Article 
further examines in Part IV. 
C.  Jewish Religious Law 
The property issues arising from a divorce are civil matters to which re-
ligious law should not be applied.  However, religious law influences the 
rabbinical court when issues of property and adultery are brought before it.  
First, the theoretical basis for the property arrangement in Jewish religious 
law does not focus on the autonomy of the spouses as individuals.175  Sharing 
is not expressed in the property relationship, and there is no joint property 
regime between spouses.176  Instead, there is a separation of property along 
with a relationship of mutual dependence that is created by other rights and 
obligations.177  For example, the husband is obligated to provide support for 
his wife and the wife has an obligation to transfer her income to him. 
 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. (Rivlin, J., concurring). 
 175. SC 1/50 Sidis v. Registrar of Jerusalem Execution Office 8 PD 1020, 1130 
[1954] (Isr.).  
 176. See Maidi S. Katz, The Married Woman and Her Expense Account: A Study 
of the Married Woman’s Ownership and Use of Marital Property in Jewish Law, in 
13 JEWISH L. ANN. 101, 101-09 (Berachyahu Lifshitz ed., 2000). 
 177. Id. 
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In Jewish religious law, the consent of the spouses is sufficient to allow 
for dissolution of marriage.178  But when there is no consent, grounds for 
divorce are required.179  Some grounds for divorce are not dependent upon 
the behavior of the spouse, such as disabilities and illnesses, and others are 
dependent upon proof of fault, such as the inappropriate behavior of the 
spouse.180 
There is a correlation between the influence of fault on the divorce laws 
themselves and its influence on the property relations between spouses.  Be-
havior that causes the destruction of family life leads to economic sanctions 
against the individual at fault.  The treatment of fault is not gender neutral.  
Asymmetry exists between the consequences of the extramarital relationships 
of a woman and those of a man.  When the wife is proven to be at fault, her 
husband is obligated to divorce her.  181   If the court rules for divorce based 
upon two witnesses, the woman loses her ketubah (her financial rights upon 
divorce under the Jewish marriage document), her alimony, and – of course – 
her property that has always been in the sole possession of her husband.  182   In 
contrast, when a husband is disloyal, the only sanctions are the loss of his 
wife’s handiwork and her income.183 
IV.  THE MODERN THEORETICAL RATIONALES FOR JOINT PROPERTY 
A.  The Joint Property Principles 
Aside from the clear ruling in Israeli court decisions that fault is not to 
be weighed in property distribution, no other explanations are given.  This 
may be due to the delicate and fragile nature of family law in Israel, in which 
the separation of church and state is not applied and legislation imposes reli-
gious norms upon the general secular public.  For example, divorce proceed-
ings are determined by religious law, in which fault is a primary considera-
tion.  The issue of property is determined by civil law, which differs from 
religious law in this regard.  Civil courts recognized that extramarital rela-
tionships are given significant weight in divorce proceedings, and a particular 
remedy is provided to the party who was harmed, so the courts viewed them-
selves as exempt from compensating for that harm through the property dis-
 
 178. Kimberly Scheuerman, Enforceability of Agreements to Obtain a Religious 
Divorce, 23 J. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 425, 427 (2010). 
 179. Michelle Greenberg-Kobrin, Civil Enforceability of Religious Prenuptial 
Agreements, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 359, 364-66 (1999). 
 180. See id. at 365-66. 
 181. Irving Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah: A Study in Halacha, Contract, 
and the First Amendment, 51 MD. L. REV. 312, 324 (1992); Mishneh Torah, Ishut 
24:17; Shulchan Aruch, Even Haezer 11:1. 
 182. See Mishneh Torah, Ishut 24:16-18; Shulchan Aruch, Even Haezer, 115:5; 
PDR 8, 354. 
 183. CA (Jer) 755/05 Anonymous v. Anonymous (Dec. 5, 2005), Nevo Legal 
Database (by subscription) (Isr.). 
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tribution proceeding.  In contrast, under the laws in the United States, extra-
marital relationships are not weighed at all in the divorce proceeding.184  For 
that reason it is more appropriate for the legal systems in the United States to 
compensate for this fault by weighing extramarital relationships in property 
distribution. 
However, aside from religious considerations, it is worthwhile to exam-
ine the modern rationales for joint property between spouses as reflected in 
the Israeli legal system.  These rationales are also relevant to the American 
legal systems.  The rule of joint property in Israel was created by court deci-
sions.  At first, it was defined as follows: “When there is no agreement, or 
when the intent of the parties at the time of the purchase is unclear, the court 
attributes to them the intention that the property will belong to both of them 
in equal portions.”  185   Sharing is characterized by complete and “equal divi-
sion” from the beginning of the marital relationship.186  At first, the joint 
property rule was built on two central elements: the existence of a normal 
marital life (mutual respect, no violence, taking care for each other, etc.) and 
a joint effort.187   In later years, the focus transferred from the element of 
normal marital life to the element of joint effort.  With time, this element 
essentially required that a couple live together under one roof.188  Ultimately, 
the joint property rule is a legal tool intended to create an exception to the 
general property laws and the laws of evidence.  Without the joint property 
tool, spouses would be subject to a separation property regime. 
In early decisions, courts based the joint property rules on a contractual 
rationale, setting forth an implied agreement between the spouses.189  Under 
this implied agreement, spouses intended to share their rights equally.  190  The 
 
 184. See, e.g., Suzanne A. Kim, The Neutered Parent, 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 
1, 15 (2012) (noting that “concepts of sexual fault no longer formally determine[] the 
status relationships of men and women in divorce”).  But see In re Blanchflower, 834 
A.2d 1010, 1011-13 (N.H. 2003) (reiterating that adultery is grounds for a fault-based 
divorce); Crawford v. Crawford, No. 259108, 2006 WL 1330321, at *1 (Mich. Ct. 
App. May 16, 2006) (holding that an extramarital relationship – even if nonsexual in 
nature – can be the primary reason for a divorce). 
 185. CA 300/64 Berger v. Dir. of Estate Tax 19(1) PD 240, 245 [1965] (Isr.); 
MENASHE SHAVA, PERSONAL LAW IN ISRAEL, vol. 1, 191-96 (2001).  
 186. See The Spouses Property Relations Law, 5733-1973, 27 LSI 276 § 3 (1973) 
(Isr.).  This system of property distribution is different from the system of “equitable 
distribution,” which is customary in many of the states in the United States.  See su-
pra Part I; see also Shahar Lifshitz, Past Property, Future Property, and the Philoso-
phy of the Presumption of Joint Property, 34 HEBREW U. L. REV. 627, 655 (2004). 
 187. See CA 52/80 Shahar v. Fridman 38(1) PD 443, 458 [1984] (Isr.).  Under 
these conditions, the joint property principles may also apply to unmarried spouses 
who are living together.  See id. 
 188. See CA 234/80 Gadasi v. Gadasi 36(2) PD 645, 650 [1982] (Isr.). 
 189. See Shahar, 38(1) PD 443. 
 190. See Berger, 19(1) PD 240. 
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courts investigated those intentions,191 and the element of a normal marital 
life suited the contractual rationale.  However, in a strained marital relation-
ship, that rationale could not easily serve as a solid theoretical basis for the 
joint property rule.  Furthermore, the investigation of the spouse’s intentions 
was not a simple task.192  And it was even more complicated when the “inten-
tion attributed to the parties” actually focused on “the intention attributed to 
the registered owner of the property.”193  In addition, critics argue that the 
contractual rationale is based on a fiction: the court attributes intentions to the 
parties based on its evaluations, which are actually a matter of legal policy.194 
The limitations of the contractual rationale motivated the courts to adopt 
the proprietary rationale.195  Courts’ investigations into the parties’ intentions 
became less frequent.196  The proprietary rationale led to a focus on the ele-
ment of joint effort, and this focus brought the joint property rule closer to a 
sort of statutory sharing regime.  Eventually, the joint property rule began to 
reflect the law of trusts or equity.197  This transition was impacted by the so-
cial perception of marriage as a free relationship between two spouses, based 
on equality and preservation of individual autonomy.  198  
The distinction between the contractual rationale and the proprietary ra-
tionale is not a dichotomy.199  The second rationale did not completely re-
place the first, and in later decisions, one can still find statements relying 
upon the contractual construction.200  Courts’ movement between the ration-
ales is not one directional, but swings back and forth.201  These divergent 
 
 191. The investigation is to determine the intentions of the spouses during the 
marriage and not at the time of its dissolution.  See, e.g., CA 651/79 Salman v. Sal-
man 36(1) PD 554, 555 [1982] (Isr.). 
 192. Indeed, in some cases it was argued that it was a fiction.  See, e.g., CA 
1558/94 Nafisi v. Nafisi 50(3) PD 573, 617 [1996] (Isr.). 
 193. See, e.g., CA 135/68 Bareli v. Dir. of Estate Tax, Jerusalem, 23(1) PD 393, 
398 [1969] (Isr.); CA 529/76 Svirski v. Svirski 31(2) PD 233, 237 [1977] (Isr.). 
 194. See, e.g., CA 253/65 Briker v. Briker 20(1) PD 589, 597 [1966] (Isr.); CA 
77/77 Rahabi v. Rahabi 33(1) PD 729, 734 [1979] (Isr.). 
 195. See Lifshitz, supra note 186, at 691 (arguing that this change began in the 
beginning of the 1980s).  For more about the rejection of the contractual rationale as 
the real rationale for joint property, see ARIEL ROSEN-ZVI, ISRAEL FAMILY LAW: THE 
SACRED AND THE SECULAR 225, 231 (1990). 
 196. See e.g., Nafisi, 50(3) PD at 605. 
 197. See Briker, 20(1) PD at 595; see also HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY AT A 
CROSSROADS 468 (2005). 
 198. See CA 8791/00 Shalem v. Twinco ¶¶ 8-11 (Dec. 13, 2006) (Isr.); CA (Jer) 
4623/04 Anonymous v. Anonymous ¶¶ 7-10 (Oct. 8, 2004) (Isr.). 
 199. See Lifshitz, supra note 186, at 634 (arguing that the decisions of the 1960s 
show that the contractual rationale was more dominant then, while in the 1980s the 
decisions were more suited to the model of the judicial presumption).  But see id. at 
695 n.242 (indicating that the decisions are not always consistent). 
 200. See, e.g., CA 630/79 Liberman v. Liberman 35(4) PD 359, 368 [1981] (Isr.); 
CA 663/87 Natan v. Grayner 45(1) PD 104, 109 [1990] (Isr.). 
 201. See, e.g., CA 75/79 Avrahami v. Yisraeli 34(2) PD 216 [1980] (Isr.). 
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rationales lead to conflicting results under the joint property rule.  Ultimately, 
the joint property regime became a combination of these two rationales.  202   
Consideration of both rationales allowed for courts to reach proper results.203 
With the joint property principles, Israeli law adopted the concept of 
equal distribution.  This concept takes an approach opposite to that of the 
separation of property, which was customary in most of the United States   
before the no-fault divorce revolution and is still applied under Jewish reli-
gious law.  In between separation of property and equal distribution is the 
concept of equitable distribution.  The above discussion of American law 
demonstrates the system of equal distribution.  This system asserts that family 
property is joint property from the day that it is acquired and gives less 
weight to fault in determining property distribution.  In contrast, fault is more 
relevant under the system of equitable distribution, which views family prop-
erty as separate property and provides for property sharing only at the end of 
the marriage.  The joint property rule in Israel is based on the concept of 
equal distribution, making fault ostensibly less relevant.  But the joint proper-
ty rule in Israel is the result of deeper theoretical bases.  Thus, there is a need 
to examine the question of consideration of moral fault in light of these bases. 
As stated, the fundamental theory supporting the joint property rule is 
the contractual rationale.  The primary purpose of property arrangements 
between spouses is fulfilling the will of the spouses.  The law’s role is to in-
vestigate the spouses’ presumed intentions and to determine property distri-
bution that reflects their will.  This approach, based on both economic and 
psychological logic, assumes that spouses who conduct a “normal” marital 
life in which each contributes to the family effort would agree on a joint 
property arrangement.  204  The determination of the nature and content of the 
joint property arrangement is therefore not a normative process, but actually a 
factual one in which the law identifies the distribution that best reflects the 
couple’s presumed intention, even if this distribution does not seem just or 
fair to the court. 
Is the contractual rationale indifferent to an extramarital relationship?  It 
seems that the answer is no.  The joint property rule is a factual matter found-
ed on, among other considerations, factual assumptions based on logic and 
common sense.  One may assume that an important factor such as an extra-
marital relationship would impact not only the content of the property ar-
rangement, but also its very existence.  The court decisions that adopted the 
contractual rationale determined that, in order to determine an intent to create 
joint property, two elements must be fulfilled – a normal marital life and joint 
 
 202. CA 806/93 Hadari v. Hadari 48(3) PD 685, 694 [1994] (Isr.). 
 203. Thus, for example, this rationale assisted in including business property in 
joint property.  See CA 488/89 Nofarber v. Nofarber 44(4) PD 293 [1990] (Isr.).  The 
proprietary rationale also helped to include retirement and pension properties in the 
joint property.  See CA 809/90 Lidaei v. Lidaei 46(1) PD 602, 611 [1992] (Isr.). 
 204. See Lifshitz, supra note 186, at 655. 
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effort.  205   The joint effort requirement can be met by active participation in 
providing family income and carrying out household work.206  The existence 
of an extramarital relationship is ostensibly irrelevant to this requirement.  
After all, there could be instances in which an adulterous spouse also makes 
an impeccable contribution to family income or to the household work.  
However, that is not the case with respect to the requirement for a normal 
marital life.  The logic of this requirement is that the willingness of spouses to 
create joint property is integral to their marital life.  One may assume that the 
better their marital life, the greater their willingness to create joint property.  
In contrast, spouses who do not have a normal marital life will not be willing 
to deepen their commitments by creating an economic joint property relation-
ship separate from their personal one. 
The question that arises is whether an extramarital relationship can co-
exist with a normal marital life, or whether the existence of an extramarital 
relationship is in itself sufficient to demonstrate that a normal marital life 
does not exist.  A review of case law does not provide a clear answer to this 
question.  When the contractual rationale is the theoretical basis, it seems 
very difficult to establish full property sharing with the existence of an ex-
tramarital relationship, for the great majority of people will not agree to share 
their property with their spouses if they know that their spouses are breaching 
their trust.  An affair could very well be considered a fundamental breach of 
contract that entitles the injured party to cancel the contract.207  Therefore, it 
seems that judges who implement the pure contractual rationale should reex-
amine the consideration of extramarital relationships.  Moreover, the rulings 
that extramarital relationships exclude external property from joint property 
add further difficulty to the contractual rationale. 
The additional rationale for the joint property rule is the proprietary ra-
tionale.208  In the early 1980s, values from property law – especially the value 
of labor – began to penetrate the marital property laws and influence their 
design.  This emphasis on labor suggested that property should be given to 
the person who worked to create it, as a reward for that person’s investment 
 
 205. 2 JOSHUA WEISMAN, PROPERTY LAW – OWNERSHIP AND PARTNERSHIP, 182 
(1997). 
 206. See CA 300/64 Berger v. Dir. of Estate Tax, 19(1) PD 240, 246 [1965] (Isr.) 
(“The required joint effort is not necessarily financial participation of each of the 
spouses that comes from income or from his earnings.  But even  the case  in which a 
wife does not work outside of her home but manages the household and contributes 
her part to the support of the family including educating the couple’s children, may be 
viewed as an effort on her part no less than the husband’s effort who earns an income 
from work.”). 
 207. See Contracts (Remedies for Breach of Contract) Law, 5731-1970 §§ 6-7 
(1970) (Isr.), available at http://www.israelinsurancelaw.com/contract-laws/contracts-
remedies-for-breach-of-contract-law.html. 
 208. See ROSEN-ZVI, supra note 195, at 232 (“One cannot also ignore that each 
element has the ability to influence the legal significance of the other.  An extremely 
atypical marital life could shed a different light on factual circumstances of joint ef-
fort.”). 
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in its production.  The application of this concept to marital property laws 
should lead to the implementation of a joint property – rather than separate 
property – regime.  In the factual-economic reality, both spouses contribute 
joint efforts to producing and improving family property, so this property 
should be awarded to each spouse.  The increased significance of the element 
of “joint effort” – and the decreased significance of the element of “normal 
marital life” – is consistent with the labor theory that emphasizes effort in 
creating and recognizing ownership interest.209  An additional influence of the 
labor theory is in broadening the scope of property included in the joint prop-
erty rule with respect to property acquired during the marriage, and narrowing 
it with respect to property obtained prior to the marriage, without joint ef-
fort.210  In addition, the labor theory impacted the transition of the joint prop-
erty regime from a regime based on consent of the parties to a regime origi-
nating in law.  211   The judges supporting the value of the work as the basis for 
joint property applied the joint property rule even where it was clear that both 
spouses strictly observed complete separation of their financial matters.212 
Does the labor theory enable consideration of sexual fault?  One’s initial 
reaction may be negative.  This theory focuses only on the effort invested by 
each spouse, without consideration of the spouses’ sexual behavior.  Howev-
er, careful study reveals that the answer is not so simple. 
First, according to the labor theory and the argument of reward for work 
invested, the right of a spouse in joint property is reward for that spouse’s 
contribution in creating the property.  A closer look at the term “contribution” 
can better demonstrate the need for considering sexual fault in the labor theo-
ry.  It may be argued that the term “contribution” in a broader sense relates – 
not just to the couple’s economic relationship – but to the psychological-
emotional aspects of the relationship.  Creating a supportive environment 
filled with trust and security also contributes to the creation of property and 
the production of profits.  Thus, when quantifying the contribution of each of 
the spouses, one should consider, not only the direct economic contributions 
of housework or income, but also the contributions to the existence, preserva-
tion, prosperity, and development of shared married life based on trust, loyal-
ty, and love.  This understanding of the term “contribution” will allow for 
consideration of sexual fault in determining property distribution. 
Second, it has been argued that the recognition of the individual’s prop-
erty rights in the fruits of her labor is based, not only on the work that she 
invested in producing the property, but also on the injustice of transferring it 
to another person.  According to this perception, the recognition of an indi-
 
 209. See DAGAN, supra note 197, at 463. 
 210. See Lifshitz, supra note 186, at 649, 655. 
 211. See CA 686/85 Maharavi v. Maharavi 40(2) PD 631 [1986] (Isr.). 
 212. See Shahar Lifshitz, Married Against Their Will? A Liberal Analysis of the 
Institution of Common Law Spouses, 25 TEL-AVIV U. L. REV. 741, 794-96, 825-29 
(2002). 
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vidual’s property rights can be based on values of justice and fairness.213  
Application of these values to the rules of property between spouses leads to 
the following argument: both spouses contribute through the production of 
property and profits, so it is appropriate and just that such property and prof-
its be jointly owned by each spouse.  The contribution of the two spouses is 
what justifies recognition of a joint property regime.  Indeed, review of case 
law from the 1990s demonstrates that the courts based the joint property rule 
on principles of justice.  214   Understanding the joint property regime through 
this lens opens a significant door to weighing sexual fault in determining 
property distribution.  According to this approach, just as values of justice 
were the initial justification for recognizing the spouse’s right in joint proper-
ty, they should also influence the scope and content of this right. 
Thus, the spouse’s sexual fault should restrict the scope of that spouse’s 
right in joint property, whether by cancelling it entirely, restricting what 
property is included, or distributing property unequally.  In a broader sense, it 
seems that values of justice allow for weighing this fault while shaping the 
content of the joint property regime.215  Therefore, the question that arises is 
why the courts refused to consider sexual fault.  The answer is perhaps in the 
well-known understanding that the meaning of “justice” is somewhat vague 
and individual judges’ views of justice may be subjective.  A review of Israeli 
case law shows that in shaping the contents of the joint property regime, the 
courts adopted a narrow perception of the word “justice” that relates only to 
economic fault.  216   However, the vague content of the term “justice” allows 
for adopting its broader meaning that also considers sexual fault in determin-
ing property distribution.217 
The proprietary rationale is also based on a third value – the value of 
equality.  From the words of Chief Justice Barak in the Shalem case, one can 
identify two rationales for the value of equality.218  The first is that the joint 
property rule expresses recognition of the economic contribution of the 
homemaker to the family’s welfare.  In this sense, Chief Justice Barak does 
not consider equality as an independent value, but as a means of promoting 
an additional value, the value of reward for effort invested in producing the 
property.  The second rationale promotes the value of equality as an inde-
pendent value with contents of its own – substantive equality and not formal 
 
 213. For a similar argument, see Guy Pesach, The Theoretical Basis for Recogni-
tion of Copyright, 31 HEBREW U. L. REV. 359, 399 (2000). 
 214. See Lifshitz, supra note 186, at 699, 702 (“As a result of it, it seemed during 
this period that the changeover was completed and that the joint property principle 
was completely based upon the normative values of justice and equality.”). 
 215. See CA (Jer) 638/04 H.R. v. R.R. (Jan. 23, 2005) (Isr.). 
 216. See, e.g., FamC 20964/02 Anonymous v. Anonymous ¶ 9 (Dec. 28, 2009) 
(Isr.). 
 217. See Weisman, supra note 205, at 181. 
 218. See CA 8791/00 Shalem v. Twinco, ¶ 9 (Dec. 13, 2006), Nevo Legal Data-
base (by subscription) (Isr.). 
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equality.219  Ostensibly, one might suppose that those who embrace the ap-
proach of substantive equality would object to every deviation from equal 
property distribution based on fault, but that conclusion is not necessarily 
correct. 
The approach of substantive equality applies the Aristotelian principle 
of equality.  According to this principle, equality means treating equals alike 
and treating those who are different, differently, provided that the differentia-
tion is relevant to the particular circumstances.220  Thus, in contrast to the 
approach of formal equality, relating to an individual differently is not neces-
sarily harmful to the value of equality, unless the differentiation is not for 
relevant reasons.  In the context of our discussion, any unequal property dis-
tribution is harmful to the value of substantive equality when it is made for 
irrelevant reasons.  The questions are how to determine the relevant reason, 
and whether sexual fault is a relevant reason that justifies a diversion from 
equal distribution.  These questions are not factual questions, but normative 
ones.  Their answers are derived from, among other things, the attitudes of 
society with respect to sexual fault.  Thus, for example, if it is normatively 
determined that fault is relevant to property distribution, then the conclusion 
will be that an unequal property distribution actually fulfills the substantive 
equality, and does not harm it.  If, however, it is determined that sexual fault 
is not a proper consideration in property distribution, then taking it into con-
sideration will be harmful to substantive equality. 
The proprietary rationale is thus based on the values of labor, justice, 
and equality.  We have seen that disputes between spouses do not detract 
from equal distribution, and, ostensibly, that should also be the rule regarding 
an extramarital relationship, but it is doubtful whether this comparison is 
suitable.  Some matters reach down to the very foundation of the relationship 
between spouses.  Other matters – even if disturbing and challenging to the 
marital relationship – do not reach its core.  The question is how to categorize 
extramarital relationships.   Does a spouse who conducts an extramarital rela-
tionship deserve the exceptional defenses created by case law?  When the 
courts created the rules of joint property, did they envision the disloyal 
spouse?  This doubt is increased by one of the joint property rules: joint prop-
erty includes the sharing of obligations and debts,221 except for obligations 
made in breach of trust (for example, for the purpose of supporting a lov-
er).222  Case law reveals that there are different types of obligations.  Obliga-
tions connected to supporting the family are joint, even if they were created 
by only one of the spouses.  But obligations that harm the foundation of the 
marital relationship are not included in joint property.  Accordingly, it should 
be examined whether a greater burden should be placed on the spouse who 
 
 219. See Lifshitz, supra note 186, at 659. 
 220. See 5 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (W. D. Ross trans. 2009), available 
at http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.5.v.html. 
 221. See Shalem, CA 8791/00; CA 3002/93 Ben Zvi v. Sitin 49(3) PD 5, 7 [1995] 
(Isr.); see also CA 446/69 Levi v. Goldberg 24(1) PD 813, 820 [1970] (Isr.). 
 222. See Levi, 24(1) PD 813, 820. 
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requests joint property rights after having harmed the foundation of the mari-
tal relationship. 
This approach should determine that the rationale does not apply to 
property registered in the name of the spouse who was disloyal when the 
property was acquired.  The adulterous spouse might be the one to argue that 
there was no intention to create joint property and might even support this 
argument with the fact that he participated in an extramarital relationship.  
This situation could reasonably occur when most of the property is registered 
in the name of the spouse who participated in the extramarital relationship.  
Taking fault into consideration might therefore allow him to use his wrongdo-
ing to his own benefit.  Under these circumstances, the contractual rationale, 
based on libertarian thinking and the economic analysis of the law, allows for 
bringing the claim of estoppel against the spouse at fault, in order to prevent 
him from raising this argument.  The rationale behind the doctrine of estoppel 
is to protect the innocent spouse’s reliance on the representation of the adul-
terous spouse that the couple has a normal marital life.223 
The previous paragraphs dealt with the joint property principles and pre-
sented thoughts as well as options for considering extramarital relationships 
in property distribution.  These options are more relevant and significant in 
the second property regime under the Israeli legal system, as set forth in the 
Property Relations Law.  My examination of American law, above, shows 
that fault is less relevant in a joint property regime than in a property regime 
of separation.  This distinction is to some extent also valid in Israeli law: the 
Property Relations Law sets forth a regime of separation of property.  During 
the marriage, each spouse is the owner of his or her own property (as in the 
system of equitable distribution), and the distribution between the spouses 
occurs only when the marriage ends.  In this situation, it is more difficult for 
the spouse who breaches trust to establish joint rights in property registered in 
the name of the other spouse. 
The rationales of the joint property rule are the major considerations in 
the question of weighing fault, but other factors need to be considered as 
well.  These factors will be discussed in the following two sections. 
B.  Different Fields of Law and Extramarital Relationships 
In the case of Anonymous C, Judge Rivlin raised the difficulty of exam-
ining emotional relationships from the contractual perspective.224  In his opin-
ion, there should be no compensation for emotional harm caused by adultery: 
As is well known, the law does not grant a cause of action for emo-
tional harm involved in divorce proceedings . . . .  Similarly, there is 
 
 223. This is the classic estoppel.  For further discussion, see Menachem Mautner, 
“Creators of Risk” and “Risk Victims”: Protection of the Reliance Interest in Israel’s 
New Civil Legislation, 16 HEBREW U. L. REV. 92, 112-13 (1987). 
 224. CA 5258/98 Anonymous v. Anonymous 58(6) PD 209, 226 [1995] (Isr.) 
[hereinafter Anonymous C] (Rivlin, J., dissenting). 
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no remedy in our system for someone who suffered emotional harm 
due to a spouse’s adultery . . . .  Indeed the law does not stop at the en-
trance to the family home, but the law abstains from trying to settle 
emotional relationships . . . .  The deceptive, adulterous spouse, who 
breaks up a relationship without justification, is perhaps deserving of 
moral, religious, or social shame, but the person injured by him will 
have difficulty finding his remedy in law.225 
Gad Tedeschi notes that the offense of adultery was cancelled in the Is-
raeli legal system with the cancellation of the Ottoman Criminal Law.226  In 
contrast, he points out that various countries, such as Switzerland and Ger-
many, include sanctions for adultery in their criminal laws or tort laws.227  
Tedeschi also indicates that although in the past sanctions were gender-based, 
today such discrimination would be impermissible.  228   Tedeschi writes that 
there are no sanctions under Israeli law against the adulterous spouse, except 
for religious sanctions.229  In one case, a court concluded that it is impossible 
to determine that an extramarital relationship is either contrary to the reason-
able norm of behavior or an act of negligence, and therefore the innocent 
spouse should not be awarded compensation for damages.230 
One of the considerations in American law for not weighing fault in 
property distribution is the availability of bringing a claim under tort law or 
criminal law.  In Israeli law, no such availability exists.  The need for such a 
separate claim strengthens the need to weigh fault in property distribution. 
C.  The Moral Argument – The Approach of Society Towards          
Extramarital Relationships 
In the Anonymous C case, which deals with the validity of a married 
man’s promise to marry another woman, Chief Justice Barak stated: 
There is no doubt that preserving the family unit is part of public poli-
cy in Israel . . . .  The interest of society supports stable marriage . . . .  
Nevertheless, throughout the years the perceptions of society have 
changed with respect to divorce . . . .  Even the aversion to an extra-
marital relationship does not reflect the approach of today’s society, 
and the common law marriage principles will prove it.  231  
 
 225. Id. at 233 (citations omitted). 
 226. Tedeschi, supra note 4, at 294. 
 227. See Tedeschi, supra note 4, at 295. 
 228. Id. at 302. 
 229. Id. at 318. 
 230. See FamC 21382/01 B.D. v. B.R. (Oct. 5, 2007), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription) (Isr.). 
 231. CA 5258/98 Anonymous v. Anonymous 58(6) PD 209, 221 [1995] (Isr.). 
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Judge Procaccia concurred with Chief Justice Barak: “In recent decades, 
the western world went through extreme upheavals in basic perceptions of 
values that are characterized by pluralism in thought and morality together 
with an increasing recognition of the liberty of the individual to determine his 
way of life.  Those upheavals substantively impact the perceptions of law . . . 
.”  232  
These words contradict the statements of some American legal experts, 
who argue that even in modern day society the majority of the population is 
averse to extramarital relationships.233  These quotations support the notion 
that the law affects the moral design of society.  234   The consideration or lack 
of consideration of extramarital relationships in property distribution sends a 
social message.  Based on this notion, it seems that today Israeli law tends to 
be tolerant of an extramarital relationship.  However, it is difficult to know 
which came first, “the chicken or the egg.”  Perhaps case law has evolved and 
does not reflect the reality in which extramarital relationships will not be 
considered a breach of trust to be weighed in family property distribution. 
D.  Proposal for a New Model – The Dominant Cause Model 
This Article sets forth various considerations for weighing or excluding 
fault as a factor in property distribution.  Among the factors that favor the 
consideration of fault are: the required coherency with the modern theoretical 
rationales for the joint property regime (the contractual rationale and the pro-
prietary rationale based on labor, justice and equality); the absence of other 
fields of law that can provide a remedy for the harm caused by inappropriate 
spousal behavior – and courts’ lack of motivation to use such cumbersome 
procedures; moral considerations; and the social message.  In contrast are the 
judicial decisions against weighing fault while determining family property 
distribution.  It seems that the desirable balancing formula is that extramarital 
relationships be considered in severe circumstances.  Such circumstances 
include those in which extramarital relationships are the cause of the dissolu-
tion.  When the totality of the evidence shows that the extramarital relation-
ship is the dominant cause of the dissolution, and – disregarding the relation-
ship – the marriage was stable, then the extramarital relationship should be 
weighed in property distribution.  I call this the dominant cause model.  But 
when the extramarital relationship is only one difficulty among others already 
facing a troubled marriage, then the extramarital relationship should not be 
weighed in the distribution of property.  The consideration of fault in harsh 
 
 232. Id. at 239 (Procaccia, J., concurring). 
 233. See Morse, supra note 12, at 641; see also supra Part II.A and sources cited 
therein. 
 234. See also ATWATER, supra note 2, at 16 (“The proscription of extramarital sex 
is one of the most ancient and stringent cultural rules regulating family life.  In West-
ern civilization, it can be traced back at least to early Hebraic society.”). 
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circumstances may better balance the values operating in American and Israe-
li law. 
Some of the approaches in American scholarly literature argue that, due 
to the emotional impacts of extramarital relationships, such relationships 
should routinely be weighed in property distribution.235  I think that, in light 
of the considerations presented above, such approaches should not be accept-
ed.  However, the model I propose will provide protection to the spouse who 
was harmed and will grant that spouse a greater portion of the property than 
he or she would have received in customary distribution.  It should also be 
emphasized that this model would operate only as protection for the spouse 
who was harmed, and would not operate to the harmed spouse’s detriment.  
The spouse who had an extramarital relationship will not be permitted to ar-
gue that there was no intent to share property.  On the contrary, the considera-
tion will be whether to grant the spouse who was harmed more than the prop-
erty to which he or she would have otherwise been entitled in a customary 
distribution. 
There is an additional aspect to this model.  The spouse who has an ex-
tramarital relationship will not be allowed to claim joint rights in the external 
property of the other spouse even if he or she would be able to do so in a cus-
tomary distribution.  Property that did not result from the couple’s joint effort 
will not be included in the shared property.  Such will also be the case when 
the owner of the external property is the individual that had an extramarital 
relationship.  The law does not have to punish him by transferring his person-
al property to his spouse.  Yet it is possible that the spouse who was harmed 
will be given a greater portion of property acquired by the couple than he 
would have received under the customary rules of property division. 
Implementation of this model in the United States and Israel might raise 
questions.  The first question is a qualitative one: at what precise point will 
extramarital relationships be considered severe cases?  The second question is 
quantitative: how should severe extramarital relationships be weighed, and 
what percentage of property will the individual in such a relationship lose?  
The third question is: how can the dominant cause of the marriage dissolution 
be identified?  The fourth question is actually derived from the previous three 
questions: how arbitrary are court decisions when there are no defined 
tests?236 
I do not have clear responses for these questions, but note that the lack 
of consideration of extramarital relationships also raises significant difficul-
ties.  The problematic nature of evaluation does not lessen or nullify the right 
of the injured spouse.  Both the Israeli and American judicial systems have 
 
 235. See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 46, at 624. 
 236. Thus, for example, the breaking point of the marriage must be determined.  
From that point on, this sort of behavior will not be considered as having brought the 
marriage to an end.  Clearly, for example, sexual fault after living apart will not be 
weighed in the same way as sexual fault before the separation.  See, e.g., Ferrucci v. 
Ferrucci, 527 A.2d 1207, 1208 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987); Smith v. Smith, 363 S.E.2d 
404, 406, 408 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987). 
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recently demonstrated that the courts are not deterred from handling complex 
questions, provided that an individual’s rights will not be denied.  I am refer-
ring to the determination that within property distribution, the personal capi-
tal, earning capability, and reputation of each of the spouses must also be 
distributed.237  The Israel Supreme Court has noted that, with time, criteria 
will be formed to assist the evaluation of intangible property.238  In my opin-
ion, that is also the appropriate approach to our matter. 
Nevertheless there is a distinction between the Israeli and American le-
gal systems.  The determination of property distribution looks at the past: the 
law seeks to distribute the property accumulated by the family in the past and 
to determine with which property each spouse will leave the marriage.  The 
determination of alimony, in contrast, looks into the future.239  This distinc-
tion may be correct with respect to the American legal system and may help 
us understand the asymmetry between those states that consider fault in the 
determination of property distribution and those that consider fault with re-
spect to alimony.  States that consider fault in property distribution also con-
sider it in determining the amount of alimony.240  However, even states that 
do not consider fault in property distribution consider it in alimony, and – in 
that respect – compensate the spouse who was harmed.241  This mechanism 
does not exist in the Israeli legal system.  Alimony payments are controlled 
by the religious law, under which obligations for support terminate with the 
marriage.242  Therefore, the need to consider fault in property distribution is 
even more essential in Israeli civil law. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article reexamines the issue of weighing extramarital relationships 
in family property distribution, in light of the current and modern theoretical 
rationales for the joint property principles.   Indeed, this Article examines the 
modern rationales for joint property principles in both the United States and 
Israeli legal systems, including the ways in which they relate to extramarital 
relationships.  The United States is divided on this issue.  Some states oppose 
the consideration of fault in marital dissolution and others support it.243  This 
Article studies these considerations in detail, presents various scholarly opin-
 
 237. See CA (Jer) 4623/04 Anonymous v. Anonymous ¶ 16 (Oct. 8, 2004), Nevo 
Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.) (illustrating that the Israeli system preceded 
other systems); Kelly, supra note 25, at 69-70. 
 238. CA (Jer) 4623/04 Anonymous v. Anonymous ¶¶ 19, 22 (Oct. 8, 2004), Nevo 
Legal  Database (by subscription) (Isr.) 
 239. Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 75, 99 (2004). 
 240. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 241. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 242. See supra Part III.C. 
 243. Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Reconstructing Fault: The Case for Spousal Torts, 79 
U. CIN. L. REV. 207, 220 (2010). 
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ions on the matter, sets forth factual data with respect to the various states, 
and uses all of this as a normative basis for a renewed analysis of the issue. 
This Article raises doubts as to whether the exclusion of all considera-
tion of fault, as established in the legal systems in several of the states and in 
Israel, is consistent with theoretical rationales for joint property principles.  In 
its beginning, the Israeli joint property principles required two elements, a 
normal marital life and a joint effort.244  The joint property principles were 
based upon the contractual rationale, i.e., an implied agreement between each 
spouse to share property.245  Later, the joint property rule became based upon 
the proprietary rationale.246  This rationale is based upon the value of labor, 
according to which each spouse is entitled to half of the financial worth of the 
property based on the work that spouse invested in it.  Other bases of the pro-
prietary rationale are the values of justice and equality.  The value of equality 
subdivides further into the values of reward for effort in creating property and 
the independent value of equality.  This Article demonstrates that a broad 
interpretation of these bases will lead to the conclusion that fault should be 
considered in the determination of property distribution.  In addition, it is 
essential to take into account that there is actually no other way to compen-
sate the spouse who has been harmed by an extramarital relationship.  Other 
fields of law do not provide an appropriate channel for this purpose because 
proceedings are complicated and lack a clearly defined statutory remedy. 
In conclusion, this Article proposes a balancing model both for the 
American and Israeli legal systems.  I call this the dominant cause model.  
According to this model, fault should be considered in property distribution 
in severe circumstances.  Severe circumstances will be defined as occurring 
when an extramarital relationship was the dominant cause that brought about 
the end of the marriage.  If the marital relationship was unstable anyway, then 
an extramarital relationship will not be a factor in determining property dis-
tribution.  Aside from that, external and personal property should remain ex-
cluded from joint property, even when they belong to the individual who 
conducted the extramarital relationship. 
The implementation of this model will also present the United States 
and Israeli legal systems with several challenges in evaluating the dominant 
cause for dissolution of the marriage: the percentage of property affected by 
each incident and the concern of arbitrariness.  However, both legal systems 
have already addressed these sorts of challenges in other contexts.  In such 
contexts they require that an individual not be deprived of his or her rights 
due to difficulties of evaluation.  In addition, appropriate protection is given 
to the spouse harmed by the unique family circumstances.  This shift in the 
legal systems should facilitate re-examination of the consideration of fault in 
property distribution as well. 
 
 244. See supra notes 185-188 and accompanying text. 
 245. See supra notes 189-194 and accompanying text. 
 246. See supra notes 195-198 and accompanying text. 
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